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 Managers who take an active role in regulating their firm's risk have te choice of 
using financial hedges, operational hedges, or some mixture of both.  Financial hedges
are those contracts which a firm specifically engages in to reduce its risk exposure to an 
underlying asset.  The operational hedge is where a firm uses its operations to lower its 
exposure to an underlying risk. Both types of hedges can effectively reduce a firm's risk.  
 Though operational hedges are an integral part of a firm's overall risk 
management program, the primary focus of the risk management literature has b en on 
the use of financial derivatives.  This is not due to a lack of interest, but to the inability to 
qualify and measure the operational hedges, which are at the discretion of the firm.  Th s 
dissertation explicitly examines the role of both the operational and financial hedge in the 
airline industry.  More specifically the dissertation addresses this issue in two essays. The 
first essay finds that airlines are exposed to jet fuel price and that operatinal nd 
financial hedges are  effective at lowering an airlines exposure to fuel costs. The second 
essay finds that operational and financial hedges complement each other. The research 
shows that airlines that use operational hedges are also more likely to use financial 




finds that operational hedges are destructive to an airline’s value, while, the results 
concerning the benefits of financial hedges are mixed.  
The first essay is the first, to my knowledge, to examine the operational and 
financial hedge in a context, in which the hedged asset is associated with the firm's costs. 
Tufano (1998) and Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) examine the use of operational and 
financial hedges in the gold mining industry, in which gold the firms output, is the 
commodity being hedged.  Both of these studies find that the use of financial and 
operational hedges is effective at reducing a gold mining firm's exposure t  gold prices.  
Similar to Tufano (1998), I find that airlines are exposed to the commodity being 
hedged, the price of fuel. Also, the first essay shows that airlines have a greater incentive 
to hedge as their exposure to fuel prices increases with both the level and the degree of 
change in fuel prices.  Furthermore, I do not find that an airline's exposure to fel prices 
depends on whether the volatility of the fuel prices is below or above its historical norm. 
Tufano (1998) finds implicit evidence that gold mining firms use real options to 
manage their exposure to gold prices. Similar to Tufano finding for in the gold mining 
industry, my first essay finds a positive relationship between an airlines expo ure to jet 
fuel prices and the price of jet fuel. Furthermore, as Tufano finds for a gold mining firm, 
there is a negative relationship between an airlines exposure to jet fuel prices and the 
volatility of jet fuel prices.  The first essay also shows that the greater an ai line’s option 
to upgrade to a newer fuel-efficient fleet is then the greater the decline in ts exposure to 
fuel prices as fuel price volatility rises.  
  Petersen and Thiagarajan’s (2000) study explicitly examines the uses of real 




firms ability to adjust production, the first essay finds evidence that an airlie’s ability to 
adjust capacity through the use of a diverse fleet provides the airline an operational hedge 
to jet fuel prices. This result is a significant contribution to the literature as firms in other 
industries have similar real options to adjust their output in response to an ever-changing 
market.  Although this study focuses on the airline industry, the results are most 
applicable to those industries which have an even greater level of flexibility to adjust 
their production.    
The first essay also shows that a newer fuel-efficient fleet reduces an airlines 
exposure to jet fuel prices. However, I do not find evidence that the operational hedge 
provided by leasing an airlines fleet reduces an airlines exposure to fuel prices. 
Although other studies have found that operational and financial hedges are 
effective at reducing a multinational corporation’s exposure to exchange rates 
(Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston 2001; Carter, Pantzalis, and Simkins 2006; Pantzalis, 
Simkins, and Laux 2001; Kim, Mathur, and Nam 2006), this dissertation focuses on the 
role of the operational hedge using a homogenous industry (US Airline Industry), and 
thus avoids any industry cross-sectional biases.  In addition to using a homogenous 
sample, this dissertation includes an expanded number of operational hedges.  The above 
studies have used only the foreign firm operations as their proxy for the operational 
hedge. This essay examines three operational hedges: the diversity of the airlines fleet, 
the uses of a leased fleet, and the fuel-efficiency of the fleet.  
The second essay examines whether operational and financial hedges are 
complements or substitutes and if the use of operational and financial hedges are value 




operational and financial hedges are complements. That is, airlines which operate a 
diverse fleet are more likely to use financial derivatives to hedge next year’s fuel 
requirements.  However, I do not find evidence that a fuel-efficient fleet or a leased fleet 
effects an airlines decision to hedge next year’s fuel requirements.  
The results that operational and financial hedges are complements supports Guay 
and Korthari’s (2003) belief that managers use the operational hedges embedded in the 
firm's real options to manage the majority of the firm’s risk, and financial derivatives are 
then used to fine-tune the remaining proportion of the firm's risk management goals.  
This result helps explain one of the inconsistencies in the risk management literature.  
That is, Guay and Korthari (2003) show that financial derivatives provide little prot ction 
to a firms' cash flow from a large swing in the value of the underlying asset which is 
hedged. However, others find that the use of financial derivatives reduces a firm's risk 
exposure (Schrand 1997; Tufano 1998; Hentschel and Kothari 2001; Jin and Jorion 
2006).  Therefore, if firms that use financial derivatives also have a tendency to use 
operational hedges, then these financial derivatives reduce the firm's risk exposure, but 
show little protection for its cash flows.   
The result that operational and financial hedges are complements is not 
conclusive in the risk management literature as Kim, Mathur, and Nam (2006) and 
Petersen and Thiagarajan’s (2000) show that operational and financial hedges are 
substitutes.  Kim, Mathur, and Nam find that multinational corporations with 
international subsidiaries are less likely to hedge exchange rates. Peter en and 




less likely to use financial hedges while the opposite is true for gold mining firms with 
little production flexibility. 
The second essay also examines if the use of operational and financial hedges ar  
value enhancing to an airline. Contrary to the finding of both Allayannis, Ihrig, and 
Weston (2001) and Kim, Mathur, and Nam (2006), I do not find that operational and 
financial hedges increase the value of a firm. That is, a diverse fleet, a newer fu l-
efficient fleet, or a leased fleet all reduce an airline's value.  There is evidence that 
financial derivatives increase the value of the airline, however, fuel pass-through 
agreements actually are harmful to an airline’s value. Although Allayannis, Ihrig, and 
Weston and Kim, Mathur, and Nam find evidence that operational hedges enhance the 
firm's value, there is reason to believe their proxy is biased as they find that operational 
hedges are ineffective at managing a firm's exposure to exchange rates.  This suggests 
that their proxy for the operational hedge is capturing some other aspect of the firm, one 
which is associated with firm value.  
 The structure of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 (essay 1) investigates the 
determinants of the airlines' exposure to jet fuel prices.  Section 1 of Chapter 2 bri fly 
outlines the chapter and summarizes the results. Section 2 of Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature concerning a firm's exposure to an underlying asset. The Section 3 of Chapter 2 
defines the three operational hedges and discusses the theoretical and anecdotal evidence 
concerning their benefits.  The Sections 4 and 5 cover the data and methodology used to 
examine the effectiveness of operational and financial hedges at reducing an airline's 
exposure to the price of jet fuel.  Section 6 of Chapter 2 presents the results, and Section 




 Chapter 3 (essay 2) further investigates the role of the operational hedge and its 
value to the firm.  The sections of Chapter 3 are as follows.  Section 1 summarizes the 
chapter and its results.  Section 2 reviews the risk management literature.  Section 3 
reviews the operational hedges and their proxies, which were presented in Chapter 2. 
Section 4, covers the methodology used to determine whether operational and financial 
hedges are substitutes or complements and if the use of operational and financial hedges 
increases a firm's value.  Section 5 presents the results of Section 4.  Section 6 concludes 





CHAPTER II:  
 
 
RISK EXPOSURE AND ITS DETERMINANTS, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FROM 
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The level of risk to which a firm is exposed, is directly related to the stochastic 
process of the underlying asset, the underlying asset’s relationship with other factors
affecting the firm, and the firm’s ability to manage its risks.  In the airline industry, the 
ability to manage jet fuel costs is an important component of success.  For instance, 
according to the Air Transport Association1, jet fuel costs have risen to account for 30% 
of the airlines’ operating costs.  This study finds that both the industry’s and individual 
airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices has increased as fuel prices has risen.  That is, airlines 
tend to experience a greater level of exposure to jet fuel prices during periods when those 
prices are rising and are at historical highs.  As the degree of an airline’s exposure to fuel 
prices has increased, so has the importance for the firm to manage this risk with both 
financial and operational hedges. 
 This chapter examines whether airlines are indeed exposed to jet fuel prices and 
whether the airlines are effective at managing this exposure using both financial and 
                                                
1 Air Transport Association (ATA). 2007. Quarterly cost index: U.S. passenger airlines. Air Transport 






operational hedges.  Financial hedges are contracts which an airline purchases to hedge 




futures, forwards, options, and other types of financial derivatives.  On the other hand, an   
operational hedge is a vehicle whereby a firm seeks to manage risk directly through its 
operations.  For an airline, the effective management of its fleet provides an operational 
hedge.  Three operational hedges for an airline are fleet diversity, fleet fuel-ef iciency, 
and the use of a leased fleet.  A diverse and / or leased fleet provides greater flexibility to 
respond to changing market conditions.  For instance, in 2008 during a period of record 
high fuel prices, airlines began cutting capacity of their mainline aircraft while at the 
same time increasing capacity of their regional jets. This allowed the airlines to maintain 
service in valuable markets while reducing their total losses.   The average age of an 
airline’s fleet is a proxy for the fuel efficiency of its fleet, as newer aircraft are more fuel 
efficient relative to older aircraft.  An airline that is operating a newer fle t has less 
exposure to fuel prices than an airline with an older fleet, as the fuel-cost-to-cash-flow of 
a newer aircraft is less than that of an older aircraft.  This is relevant, as i 2008, many 
airlines are choosing to mothball their older and less fuel-efficient aircraft in order to stay 
afloat during a period when fuel cost make it impossible for an airline to operate 
profitably.  However, an older fleet provides investment / abandonment options which 
also provide an operational hedge.  That is, as fuel prices increase, so do the airline’s
investment and abandonment options, which lower the airline’s exposure to fuel price 
fluctuations.  
I find evidence that airlines use both financial and operational hedges to manage 
their exposure to jet fuel price risk.  The use of financial derivatives, fuel pass-through 




to fuel costs.  However, a leased-fleet is ineffective at protecting an airline against its 
exposure to jet fuel prices.  
The rest of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the risk management 
literature. Section 2.3 further develops the theoretical and anecdotal evidence for the use 
of operational hedges. Section 2.4 describes the data, while section 2.5 develops the 
models and the hypotheses for the effectiveness of both operational and financial hedges.  
Section 2.6 is an analysis of the airline industry’s exposure to jet fuel prices and it bility 
the hedge its risk through the use of operational and financial hedges.  Section 2.7 
concludes chapter 2.    
2.2 Literature Review 
  In this section, the literature concerning a firm’s risk exposure and the 
determinants of such exposures is reviewed.  The degree to which a firm is exposed to a 
particular risk is determined by (1) the nature of the underlying asset and its relationship 
to the firm’s future cash flows, (2) the industry in which the firm operates, and (3) the 
operations in which the firm engages in order to manage such a risk. 
2.2.a Exposure Defined & Measured 
 Typically, exposure is defined as the percent change in the value of the firm 
resulting from a percent change in the value of the underlying asset, or its rate (Bodnar, 
Dumas, and Marston 2002; Rajgopal 1999; Tufano 1998).  In other words, a firm’s risk 
exposure to a particular underlying asset is the firm’s elasticity with respect to that asset.  
Adler and Dumas (1984) show that the appropriate measure of a firm’s risk exposure is 
the regression coefficient of the firm’s returns regressed against the percent change in the 




and the underlying asset, a two factor market model is used to measure a firm’s exposure 
to an underlying risk.  Specifically, the model uses the firm’s returns regressed against 
the market returns as well as the percent change in the value of the underlying asset.  The 
two factor market model, developed by Stone (1974), has been used extensively to 
estimate exposure to various risk factors (Jorion 1990; French, Ruback, and Schwert 
1983; Tufano 1998; Schrand 1997) . 
 Unfortunately, results concerning currency exposure are not as strong as expected 
when industry and firm characteristics, along with the hedging activities of the firm, are 
not considered.  In the case of exchange rate exposure, the evidence of a firm’s exposure 
is relatively weak.  For instance, Jorion (1990) finds that only 5% of multinational f rms 
with at least 10% of their operations being foreign experience a significant exposure to 
exchange rate risk. Bartov and Bodnar (1994) find the value of the firm is affected by 
unexpected currency movements, suggesting currency exposure, but the response of 
investors to changes in the currency rate are not contemporaneous.  Their results suggest 
that currency movements matter to the firm’s value, but investors are unable to 
comprehend the significance of those movements.  However, not all studies find that 
firms are weakly exposed to exchange-rate risk.  For instance in He and Ng’s (1998)
study, 25% of their sample, of  large multinational Japanese’s firms are exposed to 
significant currency risk.  
 If a firm’s exposure to particular risk factors is systematic and orthogonal to the 
market risk factor, then it must be priced according to APT.  If a risk factor is priced, then 
there exists a set of firms which are exposed to the risk factor in question.  However, a 




priced, if the particular risk is idiosyncratic.  The empirical evidence is that investors do 
not price inflation (Sweeney and Warga 1986) or currency risk (Jorion 1991).  These 
results give further credence to the assertion that firms are generally not exposed to 
fluctuations in currency and inflation rates.    
 In summary, a firm’s risk exposure is typically defined as the elasticity of the 
firm’s value with respect to an underlying asset, that is, the percent change in the value of 
the firm with respect to a percent change in the value of the underlying asset. A firm’s 
risk exposure to an underlying asset is measured by using a two factor model which 
regresses the firm’s returns against the return of a market index and the percent change in 
value of the underlying asset.  Furthermore, the studies reviewed here which did not 
consider a firm’s or its industry’s characteristics failed to find significant exposure to 
interest rates or exchange rates.  This is not to say that a firm’s exposure t  any 
underlying asset is insignificant. Firms in which commodities account for a significant 
portion of their operations are likely to be exposed to price movements in those 
commodities.  This aspect of a firm’s exposure is developed in the next section.    
2.2.b Determinants of Risk Exposure 
2.2.b.i Firm Characteristic  
 For a firm to have a risk exposure to a particular underlying asset, the fluctuation 
in the value of that asset must be unpredictable and affect the firm’s present and fu ure 
cash flows and/or the value of its assets (Adler and Dumas 1984).  From an operational 
perspective, a firm’s exposure to an underlying asset originates from the inputs which are 
used in the production process and its outputs which are sold2.  The degree to which a 
                                                





firm is exposed to inputs and outputs associated with its line of business depends on (1) 
the relative correlation between input and output prices, (2) the firm’s ability to adjust 
production, (3) and the current price and volatility of the underlying asset. 
 First, consider the relation between input and output prices, the relative risk 
exposure of the firm is negatively associated with the correlation between its inpu  and 
output prices.  To illustrate this point, suppose a monopoly faces an inelastic demand; 
then any exogenous shocks to its input prices are passed through to its customers 
(Allayannis and Ihrig 2001; Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston 2002).  In this particular case, 
the firm is able to transfer some of its risk exposure to its customers. Under this 
circumstance, the firm possesses a natural hedge against the variability in the underlying 
assets.  This point and the empirical evidence in support of this argument is developed 
later in the context of the industry characteristics. 
 The banking industry further illustrates the importance of the correlation between 
a firm’s risk exposure to an underlying asset and its relationship between input and output 
prices.  The interest that a bank receives from its loans can be viewed as the bank’s 
output price, while funds paid to depositors can be viewed as its input price.  The fact that 
banks typically lend money for longer maturities than the funds received from their 
depositors creates a risk exposure to fluctuations in the term structure spread (the 
difference between long term and short term interest rates).  Banks have a direct 
relationship to fluctuations in interest rates since movements in the term structure are 
primarily a result of changes in expected inflation (Fama 1975; Flannery a d James 
1984).  As Flannery and James (1984) suggest, there is a positive association between a 




liabilities (deposits) and the maturity of its assets (loans).  As predicted, Flannery and 
James (1984), Scott and Peterson (1986), Schrand (1997) and Kwan (1991) find the level 
of exposure to interest  rates increases as the maturity gap between the short term 
liabilities and long term assets widens. 
 Consider the case where the firm’s exposure is negatively related to its abil y to 
adjust its production in response to uncertainty of the underlying asset (Dixit and Pindyck 
1994; Brennan and Schwartz 1985).  Brennan and Schwartz (1985) develop a model for a 
copper mining firm in which the firm has the option to suspend operations if the price of 
copper drops below a certain threshold and later to reopen the mine when conditions 
become more favorable.  This model demonstrates that the option to suspend operations 
reduces the firm’s risk exposure to the underlying asset because the firm can choose not 
to operate when conditions are unfavorable.  Empirically,  Kallapur and Eldenburg 
(2005) find that after a change in Medicare policy which increased the uncertainty 
concerning payment,  hospitals attempted to reduce their risk by replacing high-fixed-cost 
/ low-variable-cost equipment with  high–variable-cost / low–fixed-cost equipment.  That 
is, hospitals chose a production function that consisted of higher variable costs with the 
option to adjust production during unfavorable times.  
 Another component of the Brennan and Schwartz (1985) model is the firm’s 
relationship to the volatility of the underlying assets.  Tufano (1998) points out that as a 
result of the firm’s option to suspend operations, the volatility of the underlying asset 
actually reduced the firm’s risk exposure; the option to suspend operations is analogous 
to a call option.  Since the elasticity of a call option is decreasing in volatility, the same is 




case; in a model proposed by Dixit and Pindycky (1994) where a firm can continuously 
adjust output, the firm’s risk exposure is invariant to the volatility of the underlying asset.  
Tufano (1998) that finds for the gold mining industry there is a negative and significant 
relationship between the firm’s risk exposure to gold returns and the volatility of gold 
returns. 
 If financial distress costs are significant, then the relationship between th  firm’s 
exposure and the volatility of the underlying asset can be the opposite as predicted above.  
That is, a firm’s risk exposure to the underlying asset increases with the volatility of he 
underlying asset.  Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (1996) propose that financial distress
costs are a motivating factor for a firm to engage in financial hedging.  There is also 
empirical support for this theory (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand 1997; Graham and Rogers 
2002; Nance, Smith, and Smithson 1993).  The positive relationship between risk 
exposure and the volatility of the underlying asset can occur if the increase in volatility is 
associated with an increase in the probability of incurring financial distress.  Though not 
directly testing a firm’s risk exposure to the volatility of oil returns, Haush lter, Heron, 
and Lie (2002) find that firms that are closer to financial distress, measured by debt ratio, 
are more sensitive to the volatility of oil and gas returns.  This result is consistent with 
Stulz’s theory that financial distress is a motivation to use financial derivatives.  The 
evidence of the relationship between financial distress cost and exposure is not 
conclusive.  He and Ng (1998) find that for a sample of Japanese firms, at least 10% of 
whose business is foreign, the larger a firm’s size and the lower its debt, the greater its 




not for debt. Since larger firms with lower debt levels are typically less financially 
constrained, it is surprising that these types of firms show a greater level of exposure.  
 In Tufano’s (1998) simple model where production remains fixed, a firm’s risk 
exposure decreases as the value of the underlying output price increases.  Tufano 
contends that this relationship holds for a firm which has the option to suspend 
operations.  However, according to Dixit and Pindyck’s (1994) model, where the firm can 
continually adjust production, a firm’s risk exposure is invariant to the current level of 
the underlying output price.  Thus, the condition that a firm’s risk exposure decreases as 
the output price increases is not a necessary one.  With this said, the empirical evidenc  
suggests a relationship between the firm’s risk exposure and the current value of the 
underlying asset.  Tufano (1998) finds that gold mining firms’ risk exposure is lower
when gold prices are higher.  In the banking industry, Chen and Chan (1989) and Schrand 
(1997) find S&L’s are more sensitive to interest rate movement during periods of falling 
interest rates.  These two mentioned studies do not explicitly measure the impact that the 
current interest rate has on the firm’s risk exposure, but for a firm to experienc  different 
levels of risk exposure during different interest rate regimes, the degree of exposure must 
be determined by the level of interest rates.   
 It should be noted that Tufano’s (1998) result of a negative relationship between 
gold price and exposure can be construed as evidence of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein’s 
(1993) theory that hedging adds value if a firm’s cash flows are negatively correlated 
with the firm’s investment opportunities.  When prices are low, the firm has to forg 
profitable investments because cash is scarce.  Yet when prices are favorable, the 




been implemented.  This relationship between cash flow and investment leads to the 
firm’s being more exposed when prices are unfavorable, since the firm’s best investments 
are lost or gained when the price is low.  
2.2.b.ii Industry Characteristics 
 The nature of the industry in which the firm operates influences the degree of 
exposure the firm experiences from an underlying asset.  The most obvious is the relevant
importance an underlying asset has to an industry.  Empirically, Tufano (1998) finds that 
gold mining firms are positively exposed to fluctuations in gold prices.  He reports that 
over 50% of the estimated exposure coefficients are significantly greater th n zero.  Like 
gold mining firms’ being exposed to gold prices, oil and gas companies are exposed to oil 
and gas prices.  Jin and Jorion (2006) find that 32% of their sample of oil firms 
experience exposure coefficients which are significantly greater than zero. For their 
sample of gas firms, 87% are positively and significantly exposed to gas price .  
Similarly, Rajgopal (1999) finds a positive and significant exposure to oil prices for 38% 
of his oil firms.  For his sample of gas firms, 36% have positive and significant gas price 
exposure coefficients.   
 The importance of the industry in relation to a firm’s risk exposure is not limited 
to those factors which are unique to the industry.  For instance, interest rates theor tically 
affect all firms, since unexpected changes in inflation affect the value of th  firm because, 
as described by French, Ruback and Schwert (1983) in their nominal contracting 
hypothesis, there is a wealth transfer between creditor and debtors as result of 
unanticipated movements in the inflation rate.  Further, they contend that firms with 




differently to unanticipated interest rate movements.  For instance, banks are vulnerable 
to positive shocks in inflation, as they receive a fixed level of dollars with less purchasing 
power as inflation increases.  In contrast, firms with fixed liabilities but whose assets 
prices adjust with inflation are vulnerable to unexpected deflation, as they pay a fixed
dollar amount with greater purchasing power as inflation decreases.  Since, the firms in 
an industry operate similar types of assets, a logical conclusion from the abov  rgument 
is that firms in an industry will show a similar level of sensitivity to unanticipated 
inflation movements.   
 Sweeney and Warga (1986) find significant negative interest rate exposure for th  
utility, banking, financing and real estate, stone, clay and glass industries.  They contend 
that firms in regulated industries, such as utilities and financial institutions are unable to 
adjust prices in response to unexpected increases in inflation and thus are negatively 
exposed.  Bernard (1986) does find that certain industries experience greater intrest rate 
exposure than others, particularly service-related industries, some of which are 
unregulated.  However, Bernard’s (1986) results do not support Sweeney and Warga’s 
(1986) conclusion that regulated industries experience greater exposure to inflati n. Choi 
and Elyasiani (1997) find that 47% of banks are exposed to interest rate changes and 83% 
are exposed to exchange rate changes.  Again these studies illustrate the significance of 
the industry in relation to a firm’s exposure to an underlying risk.  
 Other industry characteristics can also influence a firm’s risk exposure.  First, 
consider a monopoly.  For a monopoly, the elasticity of demand for the firm’s products 
plays a pivotal role in its exposure to an underlying asset.  Since monopolies are typically 




movement in the underlying asset.  In other words, the less elastic the demand curve a 
monopoly faces, the greater the firm’s ability to pass any negative or positive shock to its 
customers by adjusting the price or the markup it charges. Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston 
(2002) develop this concept for a duopoly.  The monopoly’s ability to adjust prices in 
response to exogenous shocks acts as a natural hedge that reduces the monopoly’s risk 
exposure.  In Allayannis and Ihrig’s (2001) model, the inverse relationship between h  
firm’s mark-up and the elasticity of the demand curve is exploited to evaluate the firm’s 
risk exposure to exchange rates.  Their model predicts that the lower an industry’s 
markup, the greater its exposure to exchange rates.  Allayannis and Ihrig’s (2001) data 
support the argument that lower markups lead to greater exposure.  Furthermore, 
Allayannis and Weston (1999) find that, the greater their industry’s markup, the less 
tendency for firms to hedge.  This result is predicted if (1) hedging increases with 
increasing exchange rate exposure and if (2) exchange rate exposure is inversely related 
to markup.  
 As mentioned in the case of a monopoly, the ability of the firm to transfer its risk 
exposure to its customers is directly related to the demand curve a firm faces.  Also, the 
ability to transfer risk declines as the number of firms increases or the level of 
substitutability of its products increases because a firm’s demand curve becomes flatter as 
competition increases.  More simply, if a firm tries to raise prices, its customers will take 
their business elsewhere. Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston’s (2002) model partly illustrates 
this concept.  From the above argument, a natural conclusion is that as competition 
increases, a firm’s risk exposure increases, since any exogenous shock to its ost 




necessarily true for firms in highly competitive markets, where the nature of the product 
market forces marginal cost to equal price (i.e., supply equals demand).  In this case, a 
homogenous, exogenous shock affects all firms in the industry similarly because firm  
must adjust output until marginal cost equals price.  This adjustment process causes 
product prices to change, thus giving each firm a natural hedge against any industrial 
homogenous shock (Nain 2005).  
 Nain (2005) continues with the above argument by suggesting that in industries 
where hedging is common, unhedged firms have greater exchange rate exposure when 
compared to their hedged peers.  In industries with high levels of hedging, output prices 
are stable as hedgers are able to keep hedged costs constant.  Stable prices increase the 
risk exposure of the unhedged firm since output prices are no longer positively correlated 
with costs.  Nain empirically finds that unhedged firms, in industries where hedging is 
common, experience higher exchange rate exposure coefficients compared to th ir 
hedged peers.  In addition, firms which are unhedged in hedged industries have lower 
Tobin’s Q (market values) than their hedged peers.  He also finds that in industries where 
hedging is common, there is less volatility in their pass-through price.  Conversely, in 
industries where hedging is uncommon, hedged firms are expected to experience a 
greater risk exposure than their unhedged peers.  However, Nain does not find this to be 
the case.  Nain’s results are consistent with the notion that the greater the level of 
competition, the greater the industry’s natural hedge and thus the lower a firm’s risk 
exposure.    
 To further support the notion that greater levels of competition reduce a firm’s 




competitive are less inclined to manage their risk (Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007).  
Specifically, Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) use the Herfindahl-Herschmann 
index to measure the level of inter-industry rivalry and competitiveness.  A highly 
competitive industry is one in which the number of firms is large enough that any one 
firm cannot influence the market price or another firm’s cost function.  In contrast, rivalry 
is defined as the ability of one firm’s actions to affect another firm’s profitability through 
market prices, its cost function, or its investment opportunities. The lower the Herfindahl-
Herschmann index, the greater the level of competition in the industry and the higher t e 
Herfindahl-Herschmann index the greater the industry rivalry.  Their findings show that 
firms in industries with a lower Herfindahl-Herschmann index hold less cash and are less 
likely to use currency derivatives, which again illustrates that the greater the level of 
competition in the industry, the less risk exposure there is to the firm.  
 In his investigation of a multinational firm, Brown (2001) finds that the use of 
derivatives is influenced by its competitor’s hedging policy.  In particular, one of the 
goals of the firm’s hedging programs is “to reduce negative impacts from currency 
movements on competitiveness by providing competitive information to senior 
management” (p. 414).  This suggests the firm is exposed to a risk that is influenced by 
its competitors and the firm uses financial derivatives to mitigate this risk.  This risk is 
influenced by product market rivalry and is referred to as predation risk.  Predation risk is 
the risk a firm faces from the actions of its competitors.  For instance, a firm that has 
limited access to external capital and is vulnerable to underinvestment runs the risk of 
losing investment opportunities and market share to its stronger or hedged competitors 




behavior of  two rival firms can influence the profitability of each firm when external 
capital is more costly than internal funds.  They show it is beneficial for firms of similar 
resources to partially hedge their exposure since the rewards of being a domin nt player 
in the industry outweigh the risks.  When the firms in the industry are not similar in 
resources, then both the dominant and weaker firm will hedge completely.  For the 
weaker firm, the expected benefits of becoming a dominate player by remaining 
unhedged do not outweigh the costs of such a gamble.  Similarly, the dominant firm reaps 
little benefit from gaining further market share.  Though Mello and Ruckes’ model d es 
not explicitly show how a firm’s risk exposure is determined by its rivalry, it does 
illustrate a possible relationship between exposure and predation risk in that a firm which 
doesn’t hedge experiences additional risk from its rival. 
 For empirical support, Williamson (2001) examines the exchange-rate exposure 
for automotive companies.  He finds, in the early years of his sample, that when U.S. 
automotive makers had little competition abroad, they experienced insignificant currency 
exposure.  During the middle portion of his sample years, when Japanese auto makers 
penetrated the U.S. market, U.S. automotive manufacturers began to experience 
significant exposure to currency fluctuations.  Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) 
more specifically test the effects of product market rivalry on a firm’s risk management 
behavior.  Their findings suggest that firms with few competitors and similar 
technologies are more likely to use financial derivatives or maintain higher levels of cash.  
Furthermore, a firm with cash levels above the industry’s median and in an industry 
characterized as having high product market rivalry is more likely to increase investment 




a firm faces in a competitive market, firms in an industry characterized by high product 
market rivalry are exposed to the behaviors of their rivals.  This findings implies that a 
firm’s risk exposure to an underlying asset can be influenced by the predation risk a fi m 
faces.  
2.2.b.iii Exposure and Financial Contracts 
    A firm’s exposure to an underlying asset is obviously affected by its risk 
management policies.  If a firm is using financial derivatives to manage its risk, as 
opposed to speculating, the expectation is that the use of these contracts reduces the 
firm’s risk exposure.  In examining whether firms use currency derivatives o manage 
risk or speculate, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find the absolute value of a firm’s 
exchange-rate exposure decreases as the level of derivatives a firm uses increases.  Thus, 
as the use of financial derivatives rises, the exposure coefficient moves clos r to zero.  
Numerous studies find a similar relationship (Jin and Jorion 2006; Schrand 1997; Tufano 
1998; Hentschel and Kothari 2001).  
 Guay (1999) examines whether a newly implemented hedging program reduces a 
firm’s risk.  His measures of risk are interest-rate exposure, exchange-rte xposure, total 
risk, firm-specific risk, and market risk.  Where interest-rate and exchange-rate exposure 
are the coefficients from a two factor model, total risk is the firm’s annualized daily 
standard deviation, firm-specific risk is the error terms from the market model, and 
market risk is the (beta) coefficient from the market model.  His results show that firms 
implementing a risk management program experience a significant decline in all 
measurements of risk except for the market risk. Guay also finds firms which are new 




or exchange-rate exposure.  For instance, firms that have a positive exposure to interst 
rates will take a short position to reduce this exposure.  Therefore, Guay’s study shows 
that firms use financial derivatives as a means to reduce risk. 
 An interesting question regarding a firm’s hedging activity, is whether a firm’s 
actual use of derivatives protects its cash flows.  Guay and Kothari (2003) find the level 
of hedging activity is relatively small when compared to the overall exposure f th  firm.  
They define hedging activity as the cash flows from the firm’s derivatives that occur from 
a three-standard-deviation movement in the underlying asset.  For instance, they find that 
the median firm’s cash flow from derivative positions resulting in extreme move ents in 
the underlying asset, is about 10% of the firm’s operating cash flow.  Thus, at best, the  
median firm’s derivative position only protects 3% and 6% of its market value from 
extreme movements in interest rates and foreign exchange rates respectiv ly.  Guay and 
Kothari do report that their sample firms are exposed to interest rate and exchange rate 
movements, though the level of significance of these exposures is not reported. 
 Although it seems natural that firms would only use financial derivatives as a 
means to reduce risk, this is not necessarily the case, nor does the empirical evidence 
consistently bear this out.  Stulz (1996) argues that when a firm has a competitive 
advantage in trading an asset, it is advantageous for the firm to speculate on its 
movements.  For instance, if a financial institution gains insight into the movements of 
exchange rates from its daily business, it is beneficial for the firm to exploit this 
privileged information through speculation.  Stulz (1996) refers to this type of 
speculation as “selective hedging.”  Both Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb, 




 Adam and Fernando (2006) find evidence of selective hedging in the gold mining 
industry.  However, those firms that do selectively hedge are unable to generate excessive 
cash flows from their market-timing activities.  Furthermore, Adam and Fernando find 
that a consistent hedging policy results in a positive cash flow to the firm from its 
derivative positions.  This result is contrary to theory since hedging activities as a method 
to reduce a firm’s risk exposure should generate zero net cash flows to the firm.  
Furthermore, their results indicate hedging does not increase a firm’s systematic risk 
(Beta).  They conclude that the positive cash flows from a firm’s hedging policy is a 
result of gold futures’ being biased predictors of the future stop price of gold.  Their 
results suggest there are benefits to the use of financial derivatives in additon to those 
predicted by hedging theory.  These benefits can influence a firm’s exposure t  the 
market or an underlying asset.   
 Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2006) find similar results in gold mining firms 
that engage in selective hedging.  That is, selective hedging doesn’t result in additional 
cash flows to the firm.  They test the selective hedging hypothesis by regressin  the 
firm’s hedge ratio against the next period’s percent change in gold prices.  Th ir results 
suggest gold mining firms increase their hedged ratios as prices rise and reduce their 
hedging activity when prices fall.  Thus, based on their sample, a firm’s exposure t  gold 
prices is influenced by the managers’ beliefs about future prices.  
 In the case of bankruptcy cost, there is a direct relationship between a firm’s risk 
exposure and its level of debt.  Due to the fact that the movements in the underlying 
assets are directly related to the firm’s future and present cash flows.  Cash flows in turn 




between risk exposure and the firm’s debt obligations is only significant when there is 
high probability of financial distress cost.  Some empirical evidence supports this 
hypothesis (Tufano 1998; Nain 2004).  Firms are willing to accept this risk because the 
debt tax shield creates value for the firm as debt increases.  To benefit from the debt tax 
shield, firms use financial derivatives to mitigate the risk of bankruptcy (Graham nd 
Rogers 2002).  
 To summarize, a firm’s risk exposure is defined as the effects an underlying asset 
has on the firm’s present and future cash flows.  The appropriate measure of exposure is 
the coefficient of the firm’s returns regressed against the percent change in the underlying 
asset.  A firm’s risk exposure is a function of firm and industry characteristics, along with 
the actions the firm engages in to reduce or increase its exposure.  More specifically, a 
firm’s exposure is determined by its operations, the demand for its products, the level of 
industry competition, and its use of financial contracts.  
2.3 Operational Hedges  
 In this section the theoretical and anecdotal evidence for the three operational 
hedges which an airline utilizes to manage their exposure to jet prices are di cussed. The 
three operational hedges are: the diversity of an airlines fleet, the fuel effici ncy of its 
fleet, and the leasing of its fleet.  Both a diverse and a leased fleet provide airlines the 
flexibility to adjust capacity as fuel prices rise.  A fuel-efficient fleet reduces an airlines 
exposure to fuel prices by reducing it fuel requirements.  
2.3.a Fleet Composition (Diversity of Fleet) 
 With many industries, it is costly for a firm to exit a market and then later reenter; 




stores will maintain operations during periods when costs exceed revenues in order to 
avoid abandonment and reentry costs.  This is similarly true for an airline, which ill 
avoid abandoning a market (route) even though the airline is incurring significant losses 
on the route.  Abandonment costs are those costs associated with exiting the market, 
while reentry costs are those costs associated with reestablishing a presence in a market.  
Both of these costs can range from a loss in (reestablishing) customer loyalty t  a oss 
(regain) in its overall market power.  To reduce the level of losses associated with 
operating during unfavorable periods, and thus the incentive to prematurely exit, it is 
beneficial for a firm to reduce the size or scale of its operations.  A diverse fl et provides 
an airline with this option.  For instance, when fuel costs are high, an airline can reduce 
the level of service for a route by replacing a larger aircraft with a smaller one. This 
action will reduce the airline’s overall losses as the total losses of smaller aircraft are less 
than those of a larger aircraft3.  Appendix A contains a more formal description of this 
argument.  
 There is anecdotal evidence that some airlines use diverse fleets to protect against 
high fuel prices.  In commenting on the Delta and Northwest merger, Th  Wall Street 
Journal4  states, the two airlines are reacting to higher fuel prices by “taking steps to 
boost their cost-cutting and pare their capacity, with steps such as putting small planes 
on routes, taking aircraft out of their fleets, and reducing the number of flights per day.  
Ed Bastian, Delta's president and CFO, called the domestic market a "bloodbath" 
                                                
3 This argument is similar to households owning two cars, a large fuel inefficient vehicle and a smaller fu l 
efficient vehicle.  When fuel prices are high, households tends to increase use of the fuel efficient 
automobile.  
4 Carey, Susan and Paula Prada. Delta, Northwest post losses amid big write-downs. The Wall Street 





because there are too many seats available and carriers can't raise price  quickly 
enough to cover surging fuel expenses.”   
Figure 1 illustrates the trend in the airline industry to operate smaller aircraft as 
fuel prices increase.  Figure 1 shows a steady upward trend in the percent of the airlines’
operating fleets that consist of smaller regional jets, while at the same time, the 
percentage of the airlines’ operating fleets that consist of narrow-body or of wide-body 
aircraft has declined.  During this same period, jet fuel prices rose dramatic lly.  For 
instance, between 2001 and 2006 the percent of an airline’s operating fleet that consisted 
of regional jets increased from 18% to 37%.  During the same period, the use of narrow 
body aircraft decreased from 58% to 48%. Also for this period, fuel prices rose from 53.5 
cents to 1.73 dollars per gallon.      
Although a diverse fleet gives an airline the flexibility to adjust its capa ity to 
higher fuel prices there are other reasons for an airline’s choice of aircraft.  These include 
the demand for which the market the airline services, the level of competition in those 
markets, the distance between origins and destinations, and the operational costs of the 
aircraft.  Though these motivations are probably the major determinants to an airline’s 
choice of aircraft, the operational hedge is still a significant contributing factor.  For 
instance, as with aircraft size, the decision of a multinational corporation to construct a 
foreign manufacturing facility is not solely defined by the need to hedge (curren y isk), 
but rather is a function of other operational needs, such as the demand for its products, 









Price of Fuel and Fleet Makeup 
F
  
  Although there are many advantages to a diverse fleet, there are also 
disadvantages; for example, the operating costs for a diverse fleet are gre t r than the 
costs of operating a uniform fleet.  The additional costs from operating a diverse fleet 
stem from maintaining a higher inventory of spare parts, the need for a diverse group of 
specialized mechanics, and higher training costs for flight crews.  However, the benefits 
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2.3.b Fleet Fuel Efficiency  
A large cost factor for airlines is jet fuel.  For instance the Air Transport 
Association5 reports that jet fuel costs account for close to 30% of an airline’s operation 
cost.  This suggests that airlines might benefit from hedging against fluctuations in fuel 
prices.  Two possible methods of reducing jet fuel exposures are the use of financial 
derivatives and / or operating a fuel-efficient fleet.  Thus, airlines that choose to operate a 
newer fleet, which is a fuel-efficient fleet, should have less exposure to fu l risk.   
The popular press suggests that fuel efficiency is a major contributing factor to 
the decision for an airline to invest in new aircraft.  TheWall Street Journal6 contends 
that a contributing factor in AMR’s decision to purchase newer Boeing 737’s is fuel 
efficiency.  The article states “The Boeing 737-800s American is expecting burn 25% 
less fuel per mile than the MD-80’s, which account for nearly half of American’s 
mainline fleet and average 17 years of age” (p. A12).  
A newer fuel-efficient fleet reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel cost, rela ive to 
an older fleet because the fuel cost of a newer aircraft is relatively less compared to its 
value.  Recall that an airline’s exposure to fuel cost is roughly defined as the change in 
the airline’s value to a change in the price of fuel.  Furthermore, a newer aircraft p ovides 
the same level of service as an older aircraft but at a lower fuel cost.  Thi implies that a 
change in fuel prices is less significant for a newer aircraft than for an lder aircraft. 
                                                
5 Air Transport Association (ATA). 2007. Quarterly cost index: U.S. passenger airlines. Air Transport 
Association (ATA) 2007 [cited April 24, 2007]. Avail ble from 
http://www.airlines.org/economics/finance/Cost+Index.htm. 
 






Another way to see this is to suppose “P” is the revenue for both the old and new planes. 
“αC” is the fuel cost of the new plane and “C” is the fuel cost of the old plane, where α is 
between zero and one. 7 Assuming an infinity and constant stream of cash flows, the 
value of the new aircraft is 
δ
αCP −
 and the value of the old aircraft is 
δ
CP −
, where δ is 
the discount rate. The derivative of the new aircraft with respect to a change in the cost of 
fuel is δ
α−
.  The derivative of the older aircraft with respect to a change in the cost of 
fuel is δ
1−
.  Thus, the value of the new aircraft changes less than that of the older 
aircraft, since α is less than one.  This means a newer aircraft has less exposure to fuel 
prices than an older aircraft. 
The above analysis that suggests the fuel-efficiency of the fleet is a hedge against 
the airline’s risk to jet fuel prices.  That is, airlines with an older fleetar  less fuel-
efficient and experience higher levels of exposure to jet fuel prices.  However, an airline 
with an older fleet owns a real option to upgrade to a newer fleet.  As fuel prices incr ase, 
the value of the airline’s option to upgrade to a fuel-efficient fleet increases nd thus 
reduces the airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices.  This implies that the exposure to fuel 
prices for an airline with an older fleet declines as fuel costs increase.  The airline’s 
exposure to fuel prices declines until the point at which it is optimal for the airline to 
exercise its option to upgrade to a fuel-efficient aircraft.  At that point, the level of 
exposure for the airline with an older fleet and the option to upgrade will equal that ofe 
airline with the newer fuel-efficient fleet.  Thus, the value of the real option to upgrade 
                                                




reduces the difference in exposures between the airline with a fuel-efficient leet and one 
with an older fleet because if there is a high probability the airline will upgrade to a new 
fleet in the near future, investors will price the airline as if it is operating a fuel-efficient 
fleet less the additional cost of the upgrade. Appendix A lays out a formal argument. 
Another aspect of the real option to upgrade is that the option provides protection 
against the increase in the volatility of jet fuel prices.  As the volatility of fuel prices 
increases so does the value of the option to delay investment in a new aircraft.  This 
analysis implies that the fuel exposure for an airline with an older fleet with the option to 
upgrade declines as the uncertainty of fuel prices rises.  
The above analysis suggests that a newer fuel-efficient fleet reduces an airline’s 
exposure to jet fuel prices.  However, the gap between the degree of exposure for a fu l 
efficient fleet and a fleet of older aircraft declines as fuel prices increase because the 
airline with an older fleet owns the option to upgrade to a newer fuel-efficient flet. 
2.3.c Operating Leases 
 Operating leases provide airlines the opportunity to frequently adjust their fleet to 
changing conditions.  For instance, as the demand for a particular route changes, the 
airline can replace its current aircraft with those that are better sui d for that market  
(Brigham and Ehrhardt 2005).  Moreover, many airlines stagger the life of their leases so 
that their fleet size can adjust to changing market conditions.  For instance, the 2000 
America West Airlines 10-K, states: 
“The airline and travel industries are cyclical in nature.  Because of this, 
an important element of the Company’s strategy is to maintain financial 




component of this strategy is AWA’s [America West Airlines] aircraft 
leasing plan. As of December 31, 2000, and through the end of 2004, 
leases for 54 aircraft will expire.  As a result, if economic conditions 
change adversely during that period, the Airline can delay the growth of 
its fleet and its aircraft-related financial obligations by electing to not 
renew these aircraft leases.” (p. 3)  
In addition to staggering the life of its leases, many leasing contracts contain 
options clauses which allow the airline to purchase the aircraft at the end of the leasing 
agreement and / or cancel its leasing obligation prior to the end of the lease.  Under these 
conditions, the leasing contract allows the airline to adjust its fleet size in response to the 
dynamics of the industry.  
 Furthermore, leasors sometimes renegotiate the terms of a lease.  For instance, 
Southwest Airlines has been in talks with a leasor to return some of its aircraft since the 
airlines’ growth is less than originally expected8.  It is advantageous for the leasor to 
receive its aircraft because during this period of 2007, the general demand for aircraft is 
high and aircraft can be redeployed to earn a higher return.  Thus, it is advantageous to 
both the airline and the leasor to restructure the original lease agreement.  Further s pport 
that leasors renegotiate leases is reported in The Wall Street Journal9, which states that 
GE restructured many of its aircraft leases so the aircraft would remain flying.  
                                                
8 This information is based on a telephone conversation with Michael Kortschak, Manager Fleet Planning 
and Transactions, Southwest Airlines, in July, 2007 
9Scott McCartney. The middle seat: one reason airlines keep flying despite huge losses: GE --- No. 1 
aircraft lessor aims to avoid grounding planes; one sid  effect: low fares. The Wall Street Journal. 





 The above discussion suggests a negative relationship between the degree to 
which a firm leases its fleet and its risk exposure as the airline is able to sh d aircraft 
during unfavorable conditions and protect the firm’s cash flows.  Yet during favorable 
times when the airline is flush with cash, it renews its leases or purchases t e aircraft 
(most likely at a higher cost).  The net effect is that the airline smoothes its cash flows 
between favorable and unfavorable states and thus provides an operational / financial 
hedge.       
 Although operating leases provide a source of flexibility for the airline to adjust 
its fleet in response to changes in market conditions, however, there are other incentives 
for an airline to lease its fleet.  Other possible motives for an airline to lease its aircraft 
versus buying are taxes, agency costs between shareholders and bondholders, and  if the 
leasor’s comparative advantage to the reallocation of the asset (Smith and Wakeman 
1985).  The leasor’s comparative advantage in the reallocation of an aircraft is a result of 
its ability to reduce the asymmetric information concerning aircraft quality, as leasors 
require a damage deposit and regular maintenance overhauls from the leasees to insure
the quality of the aircraft.          
2.4 Data 
 As previously stated, three different types of operational hedges are considered in 
this essay, the diversity of the fleet, the fuel-efficiency of the fleet, and the use of a leased 
fleet.  Airlines use diverse fleets along with a leased fleet to respond to changing market 
conditions, while a newer fleet provides airlines with greater fuel efficincy.  In addition 
to the operational hedges, airlines use financial derivatives to hedge their risk against fuel 




 I use a method similar to Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston’s (2001) geographic 
dispersion measure, to proxy the degree to which an airline uses the diversity of it fleet 
as an operational hedge. The proxy is referred to as the aircraft dispersion index. The 
construction of the aircraft dispersion index is similar to that of the Hirchman-Herfindhal 
concentration index, which covers the different types of aircraft that an airline uses.  
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1  (2.1) 
where K is the total number of different models that airline “i” operates. Thi  index range 
is between zero and one, with one indicating the greatest degree of diversity.  If the 
airline operates only one type of aircraft, such as Southwest, then the index value is eq al 
to zero. The calculation of the aircraft dispersion index is based on data obtained from the 
airlines’ annual 10-k filings. 
 Operating leases allows the airline to adjust the size of its fleet to market 
conditions.  The proxy to measure an airline’s ability to use operating leases as a hedge is 
the percent of the airline’s fleet that is leased.  This proxy is calculated as the total 
number of aircraft the airline leases divided by the total number of aircraft owned and 
leased.  This proxy includes those aircraft that are used for spare parts, not yet i service, 
and subleased to other airlines.  The leasing data is obtained from the airline’s an ual 
10-K filings. 
 As mentioned earlier, the hypothesis is that airlines with an older fleet exp ri nce 
a greater risk exposure to jet fuel costs than airlines with a newer fleet.  To test this 




of an airline’s fleet is a weighted average of the age of the different aircraft the airline 
operates.  The fleet age is reported annually and rounded to the nearest integer.  The two
reasons for rounding to the nearest integers are (1) many airlines only report the age of 
the fleet in round years and (2) it reduces possible biases created by smalleraircraft since 
smaller aircraft are usually younger.  When the age of the fleet is not reported, the nearest 
/ earliest possible reported age is used.  For instance, Mesa Airlines reported its fleet in 
1998 but not 1999.  In this case the age of Mesa’s fleet in 1998 is used for 1999.  The 
average ages of the fleet is from the airline’s 10-K.  The average fleet age for Express Jet, 
Mesaba and Vanguard Airlines are not reported in their 10-K filings and thus are 
excluded from the sample.   
 Table I summarizes the major statistics for each sample airline and for the 
industry.  The table reveals a wide range of strategies concerning the diversity of the 
airlines’ fleets.  For instance, Southwest and Pinnacle both operate only one type of 
aircraft in their fleets, the Boeing 737 and the CRJ regional jet respectively, whi e 
American, Delta, and United Airlines operate the most diverse fleets.  Also Table I shows 
wide variations in the ages of the airlines’ fleets.  For example, Jet Blue, a newer airline, 
has one of the youngest fleets with an average age of 2 years.  Tower Air, which filed for 
bankruptcy in 2000, has the oldest fleet with an average age of over 22 years.  Southwest 
and Northwest, which are some of the oldest airlines in the industry, have an average 
fleet age of 9 years and 19 years respectively.  Therefore the age of the airline doesn’t 
necessarily imply the age of its aircraft. In addition, many newer airlines choose to lease 




 To measure the degree to which the airline uses financial hedges I use the current 
year’s hedging activity.  Another indicator to measure the degree to which an airline 
hedges its fuel cost is whether the airline has a fuel pass-through agreement.  Fuel pass-
through agreements are typically contracts between a regional airline and a mainline 
airline.  These contracts cover a regional airline’s fuel costs for the service that it 
provides to the mainline carrier.  The percent of jet fuel costs that are hedged and the use 
of fuel pass-through agreements are used as proxies by Carter, Rogers, and Simki s 
(2006).  This proxy is from the airline’s 10-K filing over the period 1994 to 2006.   
 The sample airlines are those with a standard industry code of 4512, (scheduled 
air transportation). The data for measuring an airlines exposure to jet fuel prices are the 
airlines daily returns, an equally weighted market index, and changes in jet fuel prices. 
The daily airlines’ returns are from CRSP, as are the returns of the equally weighted 
market index. Jet fuel prices are from the Department of Energy and are the U.S. Gulf 
Coast prices. The airlines’ financial data is from COMPUSTAT. The control vaiables, 
commuters, regional airline, capacity purchase agreements are collected from the airlines 
10-K fillings. The sample period is from 1994 to 2006. 
 

























Airtran 0.31 0.17 0.36 15.27 11.19 17.00 0.48 0.36 0.47 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alaska 0.72 0.05 0.72 7.85 0.69 8.00 0.65 0.15 0.65 0.22 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
America West 0.66 0.12 0.67 10.31 0.63 10.00 0.87 0.07 0.84 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.48 1.00
American (AMR) 0.85 0.01 0.85 9.31 1.25 10.00 0.41 0.06 0.41 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.51 0.00
ATA 0.67 0.06 0.68 12.78 5.24 16.00 0.72 0.16 0.69 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.82 0.40 1.00 0.18 0.40 0.00
Atlantic Coast Airlines 0.56 0.16 0.59 4.44 0.88 4.00 0.92 0.03 0.92 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.55 0.52 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CCAIR 0.57 0.06 0.59 9.25 0.96 9.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Comair 0.56 0.09 0.56 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.78 0.01 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Continental 0.68 0.17 0.77 9.08 2.25 8.00 0.76 0.02 0.75 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.51 0.00
Delta 0.83 0.03 0.83 10.46 1.13 10.00 0.41 0.03 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.52 1.00
ExpressJet 0.22 0.03 0.21 N/A N/A N/A 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Frontier Airlines 0.17 0.21 0.00 11.66 7.45 11.00 0.88 0.15 1.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.45 0.00
Great Lakes Aviation 0.29 0.04 0.27 7.00 2.40 6.50 0.37 0.28 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hawaiian 0.51 0.06 0.49 17.00 7.01 20.00 0.88 0.12 0.91 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
JetBlue 0.08 0.13 0.00 2.20 0.84 2.00 0.40 0.05 0.40 0.31 0.13 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mesa Air 0.62 0.10 0.62 4.50 0.67 5.00 0.63 0.16 0.68 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.62 0.51 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mesaba / Mair 0.50 0.08 0.54 N/A N/A N/A 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Midway Airlines 0.50 0.05 0.51 2.50 0.58 2.50 0.81 0.05 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Midwest 0.62 0.16 0.68 20.08 0.67 20.00 0.67 0.08 0.64 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Northwest 0.77 0.03 0.77 18.82 1.25 19.00 0.37 0.08 0.35 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.38 1.00
Pinnacle 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.75 0.96 2.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Republic Airways 0.63 0.05 0.65 2.67 0.58 3.00 0.39 0.04 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SkyWest Inc 0.38 0.14 0.35 5.08 0.49 5.00 0.76 0.05 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Southwest 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.54 0.66 8.00 0.34 0.12 0.29 0.49 0.38 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tower Air 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.67 1.15 22.00 0.47 0.06 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trans World 0.74 0.06 0.76 16.60 2.88 17.00 0.83 0.10 0.81 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UAL (United Airlines) 0.81 0.03 0.83 10.23 1.01 10.00 0.53 0.03 0.53 0.20 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.44 1.00
US Airways 0.80 0.02 0.79 10.45 1.04 10.00 0.56 0.07 0.53 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.50 1.00
Vanguard Airlines 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A N/A 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 0.53 0.28 0.59 10.25 5.97 9.00 0.66 0.25 0.69 0.13 0.22 0.00 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.00
Fuel PassLeased Fleet Percent of Fuel HedgedAircraft Dispersion Capacity AgreementFleet Age
Reports the mean, median and standard deviation for the following variables from 1994 – 2006:  The Aircraft Dispersion Index, Fleet Age,  Percent of Fleet Leased, Percent of Jet Fuel hedged, Commuters, and an indicator for whether has a Fuel Purchase 
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Airtran 6.29 0.58 6.16 0.46 0.18 0.45 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Alaska 7.74 0.42 7.87 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.29 0.05 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
America West 7.58 0.58 7.36 0.27 0.14 0.24 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
American (AMR) 10.14 0.19 10.17 0.33 0.11 0.36 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
ATA 6.44 0.41 6.48 0.37 0.15 0.37 0.01 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Atlantic Coast Airlines 5.40 1.08 5.68 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.50 0.36 0.46 0.91 0.30 1.00
CCAIR 3.13 0.25 3.20 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.07 0.04 0.08 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Comair 6.20 0.30 6.22 0.20 0.03 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.51 0.15 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00
Continental 8.98 0.34 9.13 0.41 0.08 0.39 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Delta 9.78 0.30 9.88 0.29 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ExpressJet 6.17 0.24 6.23 0.47 0.41 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Frontier Airlines 5.17 1.44 5.46 0.15 0.19 0.04 -0.01 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Great Lakes Aviation 4.73 0.29 4.83 0.34 0.30 0.42 0.02 0.10 0.05 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Hawaiian 5.61 0.53 5.48 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
JetBlue 7.42 0.96 7.69 0.48 0.05 0.46 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mesa Air 6.38 0.45 6.15 0.38 0.13 0.35 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.61 0.30 0.62 1.00 0.00 1.00
Mesaba / Mair 5.17 0.47 5.37 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.72 0.09 0.69 1.00 0.00 1.00
Midway Airlines 5.08 0.83 5.32 0.36 0.07 0.39 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Midwest 5.48 0.53 5.72 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
Northwest 9.31 0.21 9.29 0.42 0.13 0.43 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pinnacle 5.09 0.42 5.02 0.44 0.39 0.47 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Republic Airways 6.98 0.76 7.07 0.64 0.04 0.66 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
SkyWest Inc 6.56 1.00 6.54 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.63 0.27 0.78 1.00 0.00 1.00
Southwest 8.79 0.55 8.81 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tower Air 5.54 0.28 5.57 0.19 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trans World 7.85 0.10 7.87 0.29 0.08 0.32 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UAL (United Airlines) 9.84 0.29 9.94 0.21 0.13 0.25 0.02 0.50 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
US Airways 8.96 0.10 8.97 0.27 0.15 0.29 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vanguard Airlines 3.31 0.36 3.36 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.19 0.16 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry 6.99 1.94 6.67 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.21 0.31 0.00 0.30 0.46 0.00
Regional AirlineSize L-Term Debt CommutersCash Flow to Sales
Reports the mean, median and standard deviation for the following variables from 1994 – 2006:  The Aircraft Dispersion Index, Fleet Age,  Percent of Fleet Leased, Percent of Jet Fuel hedged, Commuters, and an indicator for 
whether has a Fuel Purchase Agreement (Fuel Pass), Capacity Agreement, or  whether the airlines is an regional carrier are obtained from the airlines 10-K’s. The Log of Total Asset (Size),  Long Term Debt to Total Assets  and 






To test the hypothesis that airlines use operational hedges to reduce their exposure 
to the price of jet fuel, I use a model similar to the one proposed by Stone (1974), a 
standard in the risk management literature.  The method is a two-step procedure.  First, 
the jet fuel risk and market risk factors for each firm are measured using a two-factor 
model.  The jet fuel and market risk factors are the coefficient estimates from the two-
factor model.  The jet fuel risk factor is then regressed against the operational nd 
financial hedging proxies.  Jet fuel risk and market risk factors for each firm are the 
coefficients from the following two-factor model.  
Ri,t = αi + βi,qRmkt,t + γi,qRjet fuel,t +  εi,t (2.2) 
Where: 
 Ri,t is the i
th airline’s daily return for day t, 
 Rmkt,t is the return for the equally weighted market index for day t, 
 Rjet fuel,t is the daily percent change in jet fuel prices for day t, 
 βi,q is the market risk factor for airline “i" for quarter q, and 
 γi,q is the jet fuel risk factor for airline “i" for quarter q. 
The jet fuel γ’s are calculated for each airline for each quarter from 1994 to 2006.  
 The second step is to regress each quarterly jet fuel risk factor (γ) against the 
operational hedges, financial hedges, and other factors that affect the airline’s risk 
exposure. More specifically the model is: 
 |γi,q| = α0+ α1(Fleet Diversityi,y) + α2(Capi,y) + α3(Leased Fleeti,y) 
 + α4(Fleet Agei,y) + (α5 +α6(Fleet Agei,y))* (StdPriceqtr)   (2.3) 
+ α7(AvgPriceqtr) + α8(Percent Hedgei,y)  
+α9(FuelPassi,y) + α10-13(Control Variablesi,y) + εi,q 




I use the absolute value of the airline’s risk exposure to jet fuel prices, as the
objective in a hedging program is to reduce the firm’s exposure to the underlying risk.  
Furthermore, the absolute value of the risk exposure coefficient has been used by others 
in the risk management literature (Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston 2001; Allayannis nd 
Ofek 2001). I test the following eight hypotheses. 
 H1: Diversity reduces exposure to jet fuel prices (α1 <0). A diverse fleet provides 
an airline the flexibility to respond to changing market conditions.  That is, if fuel pric s 
are high, an airline with a diverse fleet will reduces its losses by switching to a smaller 
aircraft.  Thus, the prediction is that α1 is less than zero.   
The aircraft dispersion index is biased. The first way it is biased is that smaller 
turbo-prop aircraft are not comparable substitutes for a larger jet aircraft.  These aircraft 
lack the speed and nautical distance to support the routes which a typical jet aircraft 
serves.  Furthermore, these aircraft are less fuel-efficient than their jet counterparts and 
thus create greater levels of exposure to fuel prices.  To control for this bias, Commuter is 
add to the model as a control variable.  This variable is the percent of the airline fleet that 
consists of turbo-props.  In comparison, regional jets, which typically seat between 50 
and 100 passengers, are smaller than the narrow body aircraft, yet have the sped and 
distance requirements to service many of the routes serviced by narrow body aircraft.  To 
illustrate this point, Figure 2, shows the routes that Republic Airways10 services under the 
name United Express.  Republic Airways is a regional carrier whose fleet consists solely 
of regional jets.  Figure 2 illustrates that this carrier services many non-feeder routes.  For 
example, Republic Airways services many routes which are not feeders to United 
Airlines, but rather supplement the markets which are often serviced by larger n row- 
                                                




and wide-body aircraft.  For instance Republic Airways services the Houston to Chicago; 
Ft Myers, Florida to Chicago; and Denver to Toronto markets, which are neither short 
distance nor low traffic markets.  
The second bias is associated with capacity purchase agreements.  Normally 
under these agreements, an airline, typically a mainline airline, purchases a fix d amount 
of seating capacity from a regional airline.  In these agreements, the mainline airline pays 
the regional airline a fixed profit plus a performance bonus.  In return, the mainline 
airline is responsible for the revenue, costs, and scheduling of flights.  Furthermore, the 
structure of the agreements is such that the mainline airline leases or ubleases the aircraft 
to the regional carrier.  With capacity purchase agreements, an airline ma tains the 
benefits of a diverse fleet, yet still maintain profits and scheduling rights.  Such 
agreements cause the aircraft dispersion index to be biased, as the calculation of the index 
excludes aircraft which are under a capacity purchase agreement.  Furthermore, many 
mainline airlines shed their regional airlines during the unfavorable period between 2001 
and 2004, yet they maintained exclusive capacity purchase agreements with their former 
regional carriers.  This fact also causes the aircraft dispersion index to b  biased, as these 
airlines continued to operate a diverse fleet via the regional airline.  To control f r this 
bias, a dummy variable is included (CAP) which equals one if the airline has entered i to 













Republic Air Routes Which are Flown Under the United Express Name  
 
 
From Republic Airways 2006 10-K filling 
 
 H2: A leased fleet reduces the airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices (α3<0).  A 
leased fleet reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel price because increasi g the percent of 
the fleet which is leased allows the airline to quickly adjust to changing market 
conditions.  
 H3: Fuel efficient fleets reduce exposure to jet fuel prices (α4>0).  The coefficient 
for the Fleet Age is predicted to be positive because a more fuel efficient fle t reduces an 
airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices while an older fleet increases an airline’s exposure.  A 
newer fleet reduces an airline’s sensitivity to fuel prices since fuel costs relative to the 




 H4: Older aircraft reduce the effects of fuel price volatility (α6<0).  The 
coefficient for the product between the jet fuel price volatility and the age of thefleet is 
hypothesized to be negative. This relationship is because as the volatility of jet fuel prices 
increases, the sensitivity of the option to upgrade to a fuel-efficient fleet declines with 
respect to fuel prices.  This decline in exposure is a result of the fact that an option’s 
sensitivity to an underlying asset declining as the underlying asset’s volatility increases.   
H5: Exposure declines with volatility (α5<0).  If airlines are using real options to 
manage their risk exposure to jet fuel prices, then the prediction is that an increase in the 
volatility of jet fuel prices reduces the airlines’ exposure to jet fuel prices.  This is similar 
to the prediction made by Tufano (1998), in that an increase in the volatility of gold 
prices reduces a gold mine’s exposure to gold prices.  However, as noted in the literature 
review, the above relationship is not a necessary one.  That is, a firm using real options to 
manage its risk can show little or no relationship between its exposure coefficient and the 
volatility of the underlying asset.  
 H6: Exposure increases with the price of fuel (α7>0).  The coefficient for the 
average jet fuel price is expected to be positive.  The reason is similar to Tufano (1998), 
in that if production is fixed, then exposure increases with the cost of the input.  
 H7: The percent of fuel cost that is hedged reduces exposure (α8<0).  For the 
financial hedges, the variable Percent Hedge is hypothesized to be negative, as the 
objective of hedging is to reduce the airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices.  
 H8: Fuel pass-through agreements reduce jet fuel exposure (α9<0).  FuelPass is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the airline has entered into a fuel pass-through 




agreement and 0 otherwise. The FuelPass coefficient is hypothesized to be negative since 
these types of agreements lock in the airline’s fuel cost. 
 The control variables are long-term debt to assets (LTDA), natural logarithm of 
total assets (Size), cash flow to sales (CFTS), and a regional airline dummy variable 
(REG). As Tufano (1998) contends for gold mining firms, interest payments are also a 
large component of an airline’s fixed costs.  Thus, the hypothesis is that exposure 
increases with firm leverage. Several studies find a positive relationship between he size 
of the firm and its exposure to underlying assets (He and Ng 1998; Tufano 1998).  In 
addition, larger firms are more likely to use financial derivatives, as there is an economy 
of scale for a hedging program (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand 1997).  The cash flow to 
sales ratio controls for firms’ profitability.  Lastly, a dummy variable is included for 
whether the airline is a regional airline, since regional carriers typically operate in a 
different market in that they provide services to the mainline airlines.  In addition to the 
control variables, outliers of the Z-Score at the first and ninety ninth percentiles are 
removed from the sample because Hawaiian Airlines reported Z-Scores of -80.6 and 
-71.33 in 2003 and 2004 respectively. 
2.6 Results 
2.6.a Airline Risk Exposure (Jet Fuel) 
 The first question is whether airlines’ exposure to fuel prices is significat enough 
to support the use of financial and operational hedges.  Figure 3 illustrates fuel costs are a 




operating costs.  According to the Air Transport Association11, fuel costs currently 
account for 30% to 50% of an airline’s operating costs.  Furthermore, Carter, Roges, and 
Simkins (2006) find evidence that the airline industry is exposed to fuel prices.  This 
analysis confirms Carter, Rogers, and Simkins findings, and further finds that airlines’ 
exposure to jet fuel prices has increased dramatically in both magnitude and statistical 
significance.  In addition, airlines tend to exhibit higher levels of exposure to fu l price 
during those periods when fuel prices are high or rising.   
Table II reports the results for the estimation of Equation (2.2).  The columns 
report the average, median, standard deviation, and the percent of jet fuel risk factors (γ) 
that are significant at the 10% level12.  The risk factors reported in Table II for each firm 
are calculated quarterly using daily returns over the sample period of 1994-2006.  The 
sample size is 1,072 quarterly estimated airline jet fuel risk factors.  The estimated 
quarterly airlines’ risk factors with fewer than 59 observations are excluded from the 
sample, as there is roughly a minimum of 59 days in a quarter.  The table indicates there 
are a number of significantly negative jet fuel price exposure coefficients.  For instance 
61% of JetBlue risk factors are significantly negative.  The average airline’s jet fuel risk 
factor is -0.0902, and 29% of those are significantly less than zero using a one sided t-test 
at the 10% significance level.  Moreover 67% of the exposure coefficients are less than 
zero.  
                                                
11 Energy/Fuel. Air Transport Association (ATA) 2008 [cited June 16, 2008]. Available from 
http://www.airlines.org/economics/energy/. 
 
12 A Seemly Unrelated Regression was also used to estimate the jet fuel risk factors.  However, results are





















Summary Statistics of Airline Jet Fuel Exposures Coefficients 
 
Airline Mean γ Median γ
Standard 
Deviation γ Percent Significant at 10%
ATA 0.02 -0.02 0.28 12%
Airtran -0.10 -0.14 0.29 32%
Alaska -0.10 -0.10 0.19 42%
America West -0.15 -0.18 0.32 47%
American (AMR) -0.22 -0.16 0.30 46%
Atlantic Coast Airlines -0.09 -0.12 0.30 23%
CCAIR -0.01 0.00 0.34 10%
Comair -0.10 -0.09 0.25 25%
Continental -0.19 -0.21 0.27 52%
Delta -0.12 -0.09 0.18 21%
ExpressJet -0.17 -0.13 0.20 50%
Frontier Airlines -0.07 -0.10 0.29 24%
Great Lakes Aviation 0.00 0.05 0.58 9%
Hawaiian -0.02 -0.04 0.27 21%
JetBlue -0.16 -0.14 0.16 61%
Mesa Air -0.08 -0.09 0.22 25%
Mesaba / Mair 0.02 -0.04 0.23 12%
Midway Airlines -0.01 -0.02 0.28 7%
Midwest -0.12 -0.09 0.26 33%
Northwest -0.14 -0.15 0.22 39%
Pinnacle -0.07 -0.08 0.10 17%
Republic Airways -0.12 -0.08 0.11 30%
SkyWest Inc -0.11 -0.10 0.21 33%
Southwest -0.06 -0.06 0.15 37%
Tower Air -0.01 -0.04 0.28 13%
Trans World -0.06 -0.08 0.20 17%
UAL (United Airlines) -0.15 -0.09 0.36 33%
US Airways -0.05 -0.12 0.29 17%
Vanguard Airlines -0.03 -0.04 0.26 8%
Risk Factors Jet Fuel





Max 1.1805           
% Negative 67%
Number significantly different from 0
10% level 266                
5% level 198                
Number significantly less than 0
10% level 312                
5% level 232                
Number significantly greater  0
10% level 63                  
5% level 34                  
Panel A
Panel B
Panel A reports the average, median and standard deviation of the quarterly jet fuel risk factor (γ) for each firm 
over the period of 1994 to 2006. Also reported is the percentage of γ’s that are significantly less than zero at the 
10% level for each airline. The risk factor is calculated using equation (2.2)




 Figure 4 plots the percent of exposure coefficients that are less than zero, the 
percent of exposure coefficients that are significantly less than zero, the average 
magnitude of the exposure coefficients, and the average price of jet fuel. The figure 
shows a steady increase in the magnitude and significance of an airline’s exposure to jet 
fuel prices.  For instance, at the beginning of the sample period (1994), the average jet 
fuel exposure coefficient for an airline was 0.01, considerably less in magnitude than the 
-0.32, at the end of the sample period (2006). This change in the jet fuel exposure has 
economic significance.  Using daily jet fuel returns from 1994 to 2006, the mean daily 
percent change in fuel prices is 0.08% with a standard deviation of 2.64%.  Using the 
average fuel exposure coefficient for 1994, a one standard deviation movement in the jet 
fuel returns would have resulted in a 0.017% rise in the airline’s stock price.  This 
compares to with a 0.86% drop in 2006, or roughly a 0.1% rise versus a 5.38% fall in the 





Jet Fuel Exposures 
 
 Figure 4 also indicates a possible relationship between the airlines’ jet fuel 
exposure coefficient and the price of jet fuel.  Figure 4 shows a rapid increase in jet fuel
prices after 1999, and there after airlines have typically experienced a gr ater level of 
exposure to fuel prices than prior to 1999.  At roughly the same time, the volatility in je  
fuel prices began to increase (Figure 5). Figure 5 illustrates the increase in volatility.  
Between 1994 and 1999 the daily standard deviation, which is calculated monthly is 
above the median standard deviation of 2.25%, 27% of the time.  This is compared this to 
the period between 1999 and 2006 when the standard deviation is above the median 64% 
of the time.  This result is similar to Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006), who show a 
large increase in jet fuel prices post 1999.  Starting in 1998 and continuing until 2006, the 




















FIGURE 5  
Daily Standard Deviation of Jet Fuel Returns / Calculated Monthly 
 
 
 The above analysis suggests the possibility that airlines’ exposure to jet fuel 
prices is dependent on whether jet fuel prices are rising or falling, in a high or low price 
period, and in a period of high or low volatility.  As discussed before, if the output for an 
airline is relatively fixed, then a positive relationship exists between the airline’s 
exposure to fuel prices and the price of fuel.  Furthermore, if airlines own and use real 
options, an inverse relationship exists between fuel price volatility and the airlin s’ 
exposure to fuel prices.   
 To test these hypotheses, a series of regressions are performed.  In the first model, 
the returns of the airlines are regressed against the changes in fuel prices during periods 
of declining prices, rising prices, low prices with low volatility, and high prices with high 






























declining prices is from 1997 through 1998 and then again for 2001.  The rising price era 
is between 1999 and 2000.  The period of high prices with high volatility is between 2002 
and 2006.  These classifications are similar to those of Carter, Rogers, and Simkins 
(2006).  Specifically the model is: 
 Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t + γ1Jet Fuelt*(LV) + γ2Jet Fuelt*(D) (2.4) 
 +γ3Jet Fuelt*(R)+ γ4Jet Fuelt*(HV) + εi,t 
where LV equals one if the returns occur in periods of low fuel price and low volatility, 
otherwise zero; D equals one if the returns occur in periods of declining fuel prices, 
otherwise zero; R equals one for the periods of rising fuel prices, otherwise zero; and HV 
equals one for the periods of high prices and high volatility.   
 Table III reports the result from Equation (2.4). Column (1) of the table reports 
the results using OLS.  Column (2) uses a firm fixed effect regression.  Column (3) runs 
Equation (2.4) for each airline over the sample period, 1994 to 2006.  The reported values 
for Column (3) are the mean, median, and standard deviation for the exposures during the 
four different price regimes.  The results indicate that the airline industry exhibits 
insignificant exposure coefficients during periods of low prices with low volatility (LV) 
and periods of declining prices (D). The OLS exposure coefficients (t-statistic) for these 
regimes are -0.0138 (-0.94) and 0.0124 (0. 93) respectively.  However, the exposure 
levels are negative and statistically significant during periods of high prices with high 
volatility (HV) and periods of rising prices (R).  That is, during periods of rising prices or 
of high prices and high volatility, the exposure coefficients (t-statistics) are -0.086 (-6.21) 
and -0.172 (-17.98) respectively.  Furthermore, the lower part of Table III shows te 
rejection of the hypothesis that exposure coefficients for regimes of low prices with low 




true for the hypothesis that the exposure coefficients during periods of rising prices a e 
the same as for periods of declining prices.  The other two columns confirm the results of 
column one.  
TABLE III 
Risk Exposures During Fuel Prices Regimes 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3)
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(0.0203)             
sample size 68155 68155
R square 0.0735 0.0734
F-Statistic 1082.52*** 164.57***
Wald Test                      
γ1 = γ4
83.15*** 83.35***
Wald Test                       
γ2 = γ3
26.10*** 25.88***
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
Regress the returns of the airlines on the change of jet fuel prices during periods of low price 
with low volatility (1994-1996), periods of declining prices (1997 – 1998, 2001) periods of 
increasing prices (1999 – 2000) and periods of high price with high volatility (2002-2006). The 
models is:
Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t + γ1Jet Fuelt*(LV) + γ2Jet Fuelt*(D) + γ3Jet Fuelt*(R)+ γ4Jet Fuelt*(HV) + εi,t
where Ri,t is the daily return on airline i, Rmkt,t is the daily market return and Jet Fuelt is the 
daily percent change in the price of jet fuel. LV, D, R,  and HV are dummy variables 
representing the price regimes of low prices with low volatility, periods of declining 
prices, periods of increasing prices, and periods of high prices with high volatility respectively.  
Column (1) reports the results using OLS. Column (2) uses a firm fixed effects regression.
Column (3) reports the mean, median and  standard deviation of the coefficients from model 




 To further test the hypothesis that airlines’ exposure coefficients are greater 
during periods of high fuel prices, the following regression is performed: 





t + εi,t (2.5)  
where Jet Fuel(h) is the change in jet fuel prices when the price of jet fuel is above the 
fourth quartile.  Jet Fuel(l) is the change in jet fuel prices when the price of jet fuel is 
below the first quartile.  Jet Fuel(m) is the change in jet fuel prices when the price of jet 
fuel is between the 25th and 75th quartile.  The quartile for the price of jet fuel is 
determined between the years of 1994 and 2006.  The first quartile price is 51.23 cents 
and the fourth quartile value is 94.55 cents.   
 Table IV confirms the results shown in Table III. That is, airlines exhibit a greater 
level of exposure to fuel prices during periods of high fuel prices.  Column (1) of Table
IV shows the results from Equation (2.5) using OLS.  The Column (2) shows the results
using firm fixed effects.  Column (3) shows the results from running Equation (2.5) 
separately for each firm.  The values reported in Column (3) of Table IV are the mean, 
median, and standard deviations for the airlines’ exposure coefficients.  Column (1) 
values reveal that the airline industry tends to exhibit higher exposure coefficients during 
periods when the prices are in the 75th percentile.  That is, the exposure coefficient during 
periods of high prices is three times greater than the exposure coefficient during periods 
of low prices.  The exposure coefficients (t-statistics) for periods of high and low prices 
are -0.157 (-14.27) and -0.052 (-3.76) respectively.  Furthermore, the table shows 
rejection of the hypothesis that the exposure coefficients for the two regimes are the 
same, thus confirming the prior analysis that airlines exhibit greater lev ls of exposures to 





Risk Exposures During Periods of High and Low Fuel Prices 
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(0.0203)             
sample size 68155 68155
R square 0.0721 0.072
F-Statistic 1325.88*** 166.27***
Wald Test  / *Sign Test         
γ1 = γ2 34.92*** 34.98*** 0.0012
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
* The test for the Column (3) is a Sign test with the hypothesis Low Prices > High 
Prices.  The result is the probability of the median coefficients of low prices being 
larger than high  prices.
Regress the returns of the airlines on the change of jet fuel prices during periods of 
low, median, and high prices. The models is:
Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t + γ1Jet Fuelt(l)+ γ2Jet Fuel(m)t+ γ3Jet Fuel(h)t +εi,t
where Ri,t is the daily return on airline i, Rmkt,t is the daily market return. Jet Fuelt(l)
is the daily percent change in the price of jet fuel when the price of fuel is below 
the 25th quartile, otherwise zero. Jet Fuelt(m) is the daily percent change in the price 
of jet fuel when the price of fuel is between the 25th and 75th quartiles, otherwise 
zero. Jet Fuelt(h) is the daily percent change  in the price of jet fuel when the price 
of fuel is above the 75h quartile, otherwise zero.  The quartiles are determined over 
the sample period of 1994 – 2006. The 25th and 75th quartiles are 51.23 and 94.55 
respectively. Column (1) reports the results using OLS. Column  (1) use a firm 
fixed regresion. Column (3) reports the mean,  median and the standard deviation 




 Next, I determine whether airlines’ exposure to fuel prices is the same when fuel 
prices are rising or falling.  To test this hypothesis, the returns of the airlines are 
regressed against the returns of jet fuel prices during periods when fuel prices are rising 
or falling. More specifically the formula is: 






(r) is defined as the daily jet fuel return during quarters when the average 
jet fuel return is positive, otherwise zero.  Similarly, Jet Fuelt
(f) is defined as the daily jet 
fuel return during quarters when the average jet fuel return is negative, otherwise zero.  
The results indicate that the jet fuel exposure coefficients are significantly different 
during periods of falling fuel costs from those during periods of rising jet fuel prices.  
Table V reports the results of Equation (2.6).  Column (1) is the result of Equation (2.6) 
using OLS and the arithmetic average return for the quarter.  Column (2) reports the 
mean, median, and the standard deviation of exposure coefficients for the airlines.  The 
Columns (3) and (4) are similar to Columns (1) and (2) except that Jet Fuelt
(r) is the daily 
change in fuel prices if the quarterly change in fuel prices is positive, otherwise zero. Jet 
Fuelt
(f) is the daily change in fuel prices if the quarterly change in fuel prices is negative, 
otherwise zero. As seen in Column (1), during periods when jet fuel prices are rising, the 
industry’s exposure coefficient (t-statistic) is -0.107 (-12.89) rather than the 
-0.064-(-6.94) for falling jet fuel prices.  Furthermore, the differences in the coeffi ients 
is statistically significant (p value = 0.001).  For robustness, the summary statistics for the 
airlines’ individual jet fuel risk exposures using Equation (2.6) are reported in Column 
(2).  The average airline jet fuel risk factor during quarters of increasing jet fuel prices is  




Sign Test rejects the hypothesis that fuel exposures during rising fuel prices a e greater 
than the fuel exposures during falling price periods.  
TABLE V 
Risk Exposures During Periods of Rising and Falling Fuel Prices 
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sample size 68155 29 68155 29
R square 0.0715 0.0715
F-Statistic 1751.05*** 1749.11***
Wald Test / 
*Sign Test 
Rise = Fall 12.08*** 0.0012 6.67*** 0.037
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
* The test for the column 2 and 4 is a sign test with the hypothesis Falling 
Prices > Rising Prices.  The result is the probability of the median 
coefficients of falling prices being larger than rising. prices.
Table V regress the airline's daily returns on the cange in fuel prices 
during periods of rising and falling fuel prices. The model is 
Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t + γ1Jet Fuelt(r)t+ γ2Jet Fuel(f)t + εi,t
where Ri,t and Rmkt,t are the airline's and market index's daily 
returns.  In column 1 and 2, Jet Fuel(r)  and Jet Fuel(f) are the change 
in fuel prices during quarters when the average daily percent change 
in the fuel prices are positive and negative respectiv ly. In Column 3 
and 4, Jet Fuel(r)  and Jet Fuel(f) are the change in fuel prices during 
quarters when the change in fuel prices are positive and negative 
respectively. Columns 1 and 3 report the results using OLS. Columns 





 Next, I explore the airlines’ exposure to jet fuel prices during periods of high and 
low volatility in fuel prices.  Recall that if airlines own a set of real options, then the 
prediction is that the exposure coefficients during high volatility periods are less than 
during low volatility periods.  To examine this issue, a similar model to Equation (2.5) is 
used. Specifically, the model is: 





t +εi,t (2.7)  
where “hv” is the change in jet fuel prices during those quarters when the volatility of the 
fuel prices is above the 75th percentile, “lv” is the change in jet fuel price during those 
quarters when the volatility of the price of fuel is in the lower quartile, and “mv” is the 
change in fuel prices during those quarters when the volatility of fuel prices is between 
the first and fourth quartiles.  The volatility of jet fuel prices is the daily standard 
deviation of the percent change in jet fuel prices, calculated quarterly.  The 25th and 75th 
percentiles of the volatility of jet fuel prices are 0.0198 and 0.0297 respectively.  The 
result reported in Table VI indicates that the exposures coefficients for the airline 
industry during periods of high fuel price volatility are not significantly different from 
those in periods of low fuel price volatility.   
In closing, this subsection confirms there is significant exposure to jet fuel pric s 
for an airline.  Furthermore, the results also indicate that the exposure to jet fuel prices 
has risen significantly, both statistically and economically. In addition, he magnitude has 
also increased. The indications are that the increase in an airline’s exposure to fuel prices 
is associated with the rising price of jet fuel and the relatively high priceof fuel.  Lastly, 
this subsection does not find that the airlines’ exposure to fuel prices is different du ing





Risk Exposures During Periods of High and Low Fuel Price Volatility 
 
2.6.b Determinants of Risk Exposure 
Tables VII report the results of Equation (2.3), which regresses the absolute value 
of the airlines’ quarterly jet fuel risk factors against the previously defined operational 
and financial hedges.  The absolute value of the airlines’ risk factors is used sinc  the 
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sample size 68155 29
R square 0.0717
F-Statistic 1317.34***
Wald Test / *Sign Test 
γ1=γ2 1.500 0.9320
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
* The test for the column 2 is a sign test with thealt rnative hypothesis 
High Volatility < Low Volatility Periods.  The result is the probability of 
the coefficients of high volatility periods being more negative than low 
volatility periods.
Table VI regress the airline daily returns on the cange in fuel price 
during periods when the volatility of fuel prices is low, median, and 
high. The model is:
Ri,t = α0 + β1Rmkt,t + γ1Jet Fuelt(hv)+ γ2Jet Fuel(lv)t+ γ3Jet Fuel(mv)t + εi,t
Where Jet Fuelt(hv) is the change in fuel prices when the quarterly 
volatility of jet fuel prices is above the 75th percentile. Jet Fuel(lv)t is 
the change in fuel prices when the quarterly volatility of jet fuel 
prices is below the 25th percentile.  Jet Fuel(mv)t is the change in fuel 
prices when the quarterly volatility of jet fuel prices is between the 




analysis of the airlines’ risk factors suggests that jet fuel exposure coefficients are not 
always negative (See Figure 4).  Furthermore, the objective of a hedge is to reduce the 
firm’s exposure to the underlying risk.  Column (1) of Table VII Panel A reports the 
results from an OLS regression with robust standard errors.  Column (2) uses a FGLS to 
control for heteroskedasticity.  Column (3), which also uses FGLS, excludes the variables 
AvgPrice, StdPrice, and the product of the StdPrice and Fleet Age.  Column (4) uses a 
firm fixed effects model. All models include a year dummy variable which is not 
reported.  The standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  The statistically significant 
values of interest are in bold.  Table VII Panel B is included for robustness and reports 
Equation (2.3) with the financial and operational hedges run separately.  
According to H1, a diverse fleet reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel prices.  The 
results support this hypothesis.  For columns (1-3), of Table VII Panel A, the coefficients 
for the Fleet Diversity are negatively statistically significant at least at the 5% level using 
a one-sided test (10% using a two-sided test).  For instance, the Fleet Diversity 
coefficient for column (2) is -0.0510 and reports a Z-test statistic of -2.03.  A one-sided 
test is appropriate since the alternative hypothesis, H1, is that the coefficient is less than 
zero, not that it is different from zero. Table VII Panel B shows Fleet Diversity is 
negative and significant when the financial hedges are excluded from the model (Clumn 





The Effectiveness of the Operational and Financial Hedges 
 

































































































-0.0432*    
(0.0263)  
























Number of observations 862 862 862 862
R^2 0.2334 0.1674
F-statistic / Wald 9.68 285.29 196.73 11.03
* 10% significance (One-Sided Test)
**  5% significance (One-Sided Test)
*** 1% significance (One-Sided Test)
Panel A
Table VII Panel A reports the results of model (2.3)
|γi,q| = α0+ α1(Fleet Diversityi,y) + α2(Capi,y) + α3(Leased Fleeti,y) + α4(Fleet Agei,y) +  
(α5 +α6(Fleet Agei,y))* (StdPriceqtr)  + α7(AvgPriceqtr) + α8(Percent Hedgei,y) + 
α9(FuelPassi,y) + α10-13(Control Variablesi,y) +εi,q
Column  (1) reports the results using OLS with robust standard errors. Column (2) and (3) results 
are from a FGLS model to control for heteroskedasticity.  Column (4) is estimated with a firm 
fixed effects model with robust standard errors.  All models include a year dummy variable which 




TABLE VII (Cont.) 
The Effectiveness of Individual Operational and Financial Hedges 
 






























































































Number of observations 897 976 898 957 945
F-statistic / Wald 200.9 183.09 157.02 188.72 146.04
* 10% significance (One-Sided Test)
**  5% significance (One-Sided Test)
*** 1% significance (One-Sided Test)
Panel B
Table VII Panel B reports the results of model (2.3)
|γi,q| = α0+ α1(Fleet Diversityi,y) + α2(Capi,y) + α3(Leased Fleeti,y) + α4(Fleet Agei,y) +
(α5 +α6(Fleet Agei,y))* (StdPriceqtr)  + α7(AvgPriceqtr) + α8(Percent Hedgei,y) +α9(FuelPassi,y) +
α10-13(Control Variablesi,y) + εi,q
The columns  1-5 of Table VII Panel B reports of the model using FGLS.  Columns 1-5 exclude the financil 
and operational hedges. All models include a year dummy variable which are not reported. The statically 




 For Column (3), the AvgPrice variable is excluded from the model because the 
aircraft dispersion index (Fleet Diversity) is a function of the price of fuel and the 
average price variable proxies for the airline’s inability to adjust production.  Hwever, 
the aircraft dispersion index  proxies for the ability to adjust production in response to 
different market conditions.  In addition, the aircraft dispersion index measures the 
airline’s current operating fleet, not the airline’s total fleet.  This analysis suggests that as 
the price of fuel increases, airlines will switch to a smaller fleet, which causes the 
dispersion index to decline.  This relationship causes a correlation between the price of 
fuel and the aircraft dispersion index.  Furthermore, the value of the real option increases 
with the volatility of the price of fuel, thus causing a correlation between th  volatility of 
fuel prices and the aircraft dispersion index.  This analysis suggests that the model suffers 
from collinearity with regards to the operational hedges, the AvgPrice, and StdPrices 
variables.  
 A common approach to correct for collinearity is to artificially orthogonalize the 
AvgPrice variable and the Fleet Diversity variable.  The procedure is to regress the 
AvgPrice variable on the Fleet Diversity variable.  Then for Equation (2.3), replace the 
AvgPrice variable with the error terms from the prior regression.  The problem with this 
procedure is that the estimated Fleet Diversity coefficient and its standard errors are 
biased (Hill and Adkins 2001).  Furthermore, the estimated coefficient and its standard 
errors for AvgPrice are the same as before.  The reverse is true if the Fleet Diversity 
variable is regressed on the AvgPrice variable.  A simpler approach is to drop the 
variables causing the problem (Greene 2003).  Thus AvgPrice, StdPrice, and the product




results.  The flaw in this approach is that the estimated coefficients are biased.  However, 
the exclusion of these variables causes the coefficient for Fleet Diversity to hift from 
-0.0510 to -0.0488, while the Z-test statistic decreases from -2.03 to -1.88.  Furthermore, 
the results for the other financial and operational hedges are unaltered.  
 Columns (1-4) of Tables VII Panel A support the hypothesis that a fuel-efficient 
fleet reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel prices, H3.  For Column (2), the coefficient for 
Fleet Age is positive (0.0791) and is significant at the 1% level using a one-sided test 
(5% using a two-sided test), thus indicating that an older less fuel-efficient fle t increases 
an airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices.  Furthermore, Columns (1,2 and 4) of Tables VII 
Panel A support hypothesis H4 that the real option embedded in operating an older fleet 
provides relatively more protection to an airline when the volatility of jet fuel prices is 
high.  That is, for Table VII Panel A of Column (2), the coefficient for the product 
between StdPrice and Fleet Age is -1.8915, significant at the 5% level using a one-sided 
test (10% using a two-sided test).  The mixed partial derivatives of Equation (2.3) (see 
Equation (2.8) below) with respect to Fleet Age and StdPrice illustrates the benefit that 
the option to upgrade to a fuel-efficient fleet gives an airline.  The mixed partial 
derivative suggests that increasing the age of an airline’s fleet from 2 t  8 years will 
result in a decline in the airline’s exposure to fuel prices by 0.01573 
(-1.8915*ln(8/2)*(0.0297-0.0237)), if the daily volatility of fuel prices, calculated 
quarterly, increases from its median volatility of .0237 to its upper 75th percentile of 
0.029713.  This reduction in exposure is about 18% for the median airline’s exposure 
coefficient (0.01573/0.0884). If fuel price volatility increases from its median to its upper 
                                                
13 The median age of JetBlue’s fleet is 2 years. The median age of Southwest Airlines’ fleet is 8 years. Both 




quartile, then an airline with an average age of 8 years will experience a decline in its 
exposure to fuel prices that is 18% higher than an airline with an average fleet age of 2 
years.  
     

 	
= -1.8915 (2.8) 
 -1.8915    
0.01573 -1.8915*ln *(0.0297-0.0237) 
 Similar to Tufano’s (1998) results and as predicted from the analysis of the prior 
section, higher fuel costs significantly increase an airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices.  As 
predicted by H6, the coefficient for AvgPrice is positive and significant at the 1% level in 
all models using a one or two-sided test.  The results for H5 a e not strong. That is, there 
is a weak and negative relationship between the standard deviation of fuel prices and the 
airlines risk exposure to the fuel prices.  All columns of Table VII show that as the 
volatility of jet fuel prices increases, the sensitivity of the real options to an underlying 
asset declines.  However, only column (1 and 4) of Table VII Panel A is significant at 
least at the 10% level using a one-sided test. 
 Confirming the hypotheses, H7 and H8, that airlines use financial derivatives / 
contracts to manage risk and not to speculate, the coefficients for the Percent Hedge and 
the FuelPass are negative and significant in most models.  That is, increasing the percent 
of jet fuel hedged or entering into a fuel pass-through agreement significantly reduces an 
airline’s risk to fuel costs by -0.0648 and -0.0478 respectively as shown in Column (2) of 
Table VII, Panel A.  The Percent Hedge and the FuelPass variables are significant at least 




 The Leased Fleet variable is positive and insignificant (using a one-sided test); 
thus, there is no support for H2.  The control variables, the REG, Size, and LTDA are 
insignificant in the majority of the models using a two-sided test.  The variable CFTS is 
negative and significant in most models. The coefficient for CAP is positive and 
significant at the 1% level using a two-sided test.  
 A particular issue with model (2.3) is that the dependent variable, quarterly jet 
fuel gammas, are regressed against the airline’s annual financial data.  If the airline’s 
estimated risk exposure reflects information concerning the airline’s future financial 
statements, then the estimated coefficients may be biased.  For instance, the airline’s 
estimated risk exposure will reflect the delivery of new aircraft which are not in current 
operations or the expected spinoff of a regional subsidiary.  To partly control for this 
bias, model (2.3) is run with both the current and next year’s financial variables.  Th  
model is: 
|γi,q| = α0+ α1(Fleet Diversityi,y) + α2(Capi,y) + α3(Leased Fleeti,y) 
 + α4(Fleet Agei,y) +  (α5 +α6(Fleet Agei,y))* (StdPrice)   
 +α7(Average Fuel Priceqtr) + α8(Percent Hedgei,y) +α9(FuelPassi,y)  
 +α10-13(Control Variablesi,y) + α14(Fleet Diversityi,y+1) (2.9) 
 +α15(Capi,y+1) + α16(Leased Fleeti,y+1) +α17(Fleet Agei,y+1) 
 + α18(Percent Hedgei,y+1) +α19(FuelPassi,y+1)  
 +α20-22(Control Variablesi,y+4) + εi,q 
 
The model is FGLS with a year dummy variable which is not reported.  The 
results are reported in Table VIII.  The first and second columns are the estimat d 
coefficients for the current and next year’s variables.  The standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  The third column is the sum of Column (1) and Column (2). Columns (4) 
and (5) report the results for the test determining whether the sum of the coefficients is 




p-value.  The results confirm H1 and H3, that a diverse fleet and / or a fuel-efficient fleet 
reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel costs. That is, the sum of the coefficients for Fleet 
Diversity is negative and significant and the sum of the coefficients for Fleet Age is 
positive and significant.  The results also confirm H7, that hedging against fuel cost using 
financial derivatives reduces the airline’s exposure to fuel prices.  Table VIII shows that 
an airline’s exposure to fuel prices increases with the price of fuel and declines as the 





The Effectiveness of the Operational and Financial Hedges (Lead) 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Current Year Next Year
Current + Next 
Year
Chi Sq           





























-0.0477*    
(0.0315)  -0.0659 4.8300 0.028**
FuelPass -0.0738**  
(0.0366)  
0.0478




















(0.1041)  -0.002 0.0000 0.953
Number of observations 749
Wald 219.6
* 10% significances (two-sided test)
**  5% significances (two-sided test)
*** 1% significances (two-sided test)
The table reports the results of equation (2.9)
|γi,q| = α0+ α1(Fleet Diversityi,y) + α2(Capi,y) + α3(Leased Fleeti,y) + α4(Fleet Agei,y) 
+  (α5 +α6(Fleet Agei,y))* (StdPiceqtr)  + α7(AvgPriceqtr) + α8(Percent Hedgei,y) +α9(FuelPassi,y) 
+ α10-13(Control Variablesi,y) + α14(Fleet Diversityi,y+1) + α15(Capi,y+1) + α15(Leased Fleeti,y+1) 
+ α16(Fleet Agei,y+1) + α17(Percent Hedgei,y+1) +α18(FuelPassi,y+1) + α19-22(Control Variablesi,y+1) +εi,q
Column (1) reports the results for the coefficients α0 – α13. column (2) reports the results for the coefficients α14 
–α22.Column (3) is the sum of  Column (1 and 2). Columns(4 and 5) are the test statistics and p-values , from 
a Wald test, to test the null hypotheses that (Current Year + Next year) = 0.  The values in the parenth ses are 
the standard errors. The model is a FGLS controling for heteroskedasticity.  The model includes a year dummy 






 This essay examines the determinants of an airline’s exposure to jet fuel prices. 
This study shows that airlines are indeed exposed to jet fuel prices.  Furthermore, airlines 
tend to exhibit higher levels of exposure to jet fuel prices when prices are above their 
historical norm or rising.  Second, this essay finds evidence that the use of financial and 
operational hedges is effective at managing an airline’s exposure to the price of jet fuel.  
 This study shows that, for the airline industry, exposure to jet fuel costs has 
increased substantially over the early part of the 21st century.  Moreover, an airline’s 
exposure to the price of fuel increases with the price of fuel. In addition, airlines also tend 
to exhibit higher levels of exposure to fuel prices during periods when fuel pricesa e 
relatively high.  Lastly, there is no evidence that airlines tend to exhibit higher or lower 
levels of exposure during periods when the volatility of jet fuel is above its normal level.  
 In the airline industry, I find evidence that the use of both financial and / or 
operational hedges is effective at reducing an airline’s risk exposure.  The flexibility that 
real options provide a firm is an important part of its ability to manage its risk.  This 
essay finds evidence that a diverse fleet gives an airline the flexibility to adjust its 
capacity needs in order to efficiently adjust to changing market conditions.  Furthermore, 
there is evidence that a more fuel-efficient fleet reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel 
costs.  Financial derivatives or fuel pass-through agreements are also effectiv  at 
managing an airline’s risk exposure.  
 I find evidence that the embedded option to switch to a newer fleet reduces an 




fuel prices is high, the option to replace an older fleet reduces an airline’s exposure to the 
price of jet fuel.  There is no evidence to suggest that leasing a fleet reduces an airline’s 
exposure to the price of jet fuel.   
 The use of financial contracts significantly reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel 
prices.  That is, increasing the percentage of fuel which is hedged and / or entering into a 






This section lays out a formal argument that a diverse fleet provides an airline n 
operational hedge against jet fuel costs.  Though the discussion in this section focuses on 
the airline industry, the argument is generally applicable to other industries wh re exit 
and reentry costs are prohibitive.  That is, if exit costs are such that a firm will choose to 
maintain operations during periods of severe losses, then the option to reduce production, 
which lowers overall losses, provides a valuable hedge.  The simple intuition is that a 
firm can reduce its overall losses during adverse periods by incrementally reducing its 
production, while a firm without any option to adjust capacity will incur larger losses 
during unfavorable periods.  
To illustrate, an airline servicing the Dallas to Chicago market will generally 
avoid exiting this route, even during periods when cost exceeds revenue.  During adverse
periods, the airline with a diverse fleet can reduce its level of operations by servicing the 
market with a smaller aircraft, which incurs proportionally fewer losses than the large 
aircraft.  Using a smaller allows the airline to maintain a presence in th  Dallas to 
Chicago market while reducing its overall losses.  Compare this scenario to one where an 
airline chooses to operate a standardized fleet consisting of large aircraft. If adverse 
conditions occur, the airline will maintain operations and incur large losses and or 
prematurely exit the market.  The airline with a standardized fleet incurs greater losses 
than an airline with a diverse fleet since larger aircraft consume a gr ater amount of fuel. 
 The argument and proof presented in this section is similar to that proposed by 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  To lay out the argument, first assume, for simplicity, that 
abandonment costs are such that the airline will choose never to exit the market.  Second,




quantity of passengers per period.  Furthermore, to focus on cost and for simplicity, 
assume price and demand are non-stochastic, i.e., revenue is fixed.  In addition, costs 
follow the following Geometric Brownian Motion and have a convenience yield of δ.  
 dC = ρCdt + σCdz (1a) 
Third, assume the airline can divide its capacity between two aircraft.  The small r of the 
aircraft accounts for α percent of the route’s profits, while the larger aircraft accounts for 
the remainder of the profits. In addition, the cost (C), revenue (P), and thus profits for the 
smaller plane are proportional to that of the larger aircraft.  Fourth, to make the problem 
more manageable, assume a depreciation rate of zero.  Lastly, assume the airline can 
choose to operate all or any one of the aircraft at any particular time.  
 Based on the above assumptions, the profits to the airline for servicing a particular 
route are: 
 Π =Max(P-C, (1-α)(P-C), α(P-C))     
 Π =Max(P-C, α(P-C)) (2a) 
 
In the second line, the middle term ((1-α)(P-C)) is dropped since the profits of operating 
both aircraft or just the smaller one are always greater than that of operating solely the 
large aircraft.  Thus, the airline will choose to operate only the larger aircraft in 
conjunction with the smaller plane.  From Equation (2a), notice that the optimal cost (C*) 
at which the firm will switch to solely operating only the smaller aircrft is when revenue 
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 Compare, the above profit function to the one where exit and reentry is costless.  
Under this scenario, when costs exceed price, the airline will cease operations and have a 
loss of zero which is preferred over a loss of α(P-C).  However, the fact that exit and 
reentry costs exist implies that the airline will not abandon the market when costs exceed 
price.  
By creating a replication portfolio, the value of operating a route must satisfy the 
following ordinary differential equation. 
 
( ) ∏++′−+′′= VVCrVC δσ 22
2
1
0  (4a) 
where V is the value to the firm for operating a given route and r is the risk-free rate.  The 
solution to the above differential equation is. 
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where β1 and β2 are roots to the quadratic equation which solves the general solution of 
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−  represents the value of the route if the option to switch to a 




switch to the smaller plane if cost rises above the critical point.  The term 2βBC is the 
value of the real option to increase output when costs are below the critical point.   
To solve for A and B, two other conditions are need, the “value-matching 
condition” and the “smooth pasting conditions.”  The “value-matching condition” states 
that at the critical point (C*), the value of operating at partial capacity must equal the 
value of operating at full capacity.  The “smooth pasting condition” states that the 
derivative of Vp (operating a partial capacity) and Vf (operating at full capacity) 
evaluated at C* are equal. That is,  
 
 Vp(C*) = Vf(C*) (8a) 
 
(C*)  V(C*) V fp
′=′  (9a) 








































B  (11a) 
It can be shown that A and B are both positive; thus, the option to adjust capacity in 
response to fluctuations in fuel cost increases the value of the firm.  
 Further, the option to adjust capacity reduces the airline’s exposure to fuel costs.  
More specifically, it can be shown that for all positive values of “C,” the change in th  
value of the airline with respect to a change in the price of fuel (C) is less for an airline 
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 where d and u represent airlines with a diversified fleet and a uniform fleet respectively.  
Figure 6 shows that a hypothetical diverse fleet experiences less exposure to jet fuel 
prices than does the uniform fleet.  Figure 6 graphs Equation (5a) at three differ nt α’s, 
1.0, 0.5, and 0.1.  The airline with an α of 1.0 represents an airline with a uniform fleet of 
one large aircraft.  The α of 0.5 represents the airline with a uniform fleet of two smaller 
aircraft.  While the α of 0.1 represents the airline consisting of one medium and one small 
aircraft.  The other values for the parameters of Equation (5a) are, P = 100, r = 0.04, δ = 
0.03, and σ = .3.  The slope of the airline with a diverse fleet is always greater than or 
equal to that of the other two airlines.  Thus, the graph and the proofs above illustrate tha 






The Benefits of a Diverse Fleet 
 
Appendix B 
This section lays out a formal argument that an airline with an older fleet and the 
option to upgrade to a more fuel-efficient fleet exhibits a decreased exposure to f el 
prices as prices increase.  The basic intuition is that the option to upgrade to a newer fleet 
caps the level of exposure to fuel prices an airline will experience.  As fuel pric s rise, 
investors increase their belief that the airline will exercise its op ion to invest in newer 
aircraft, thus pricing the firm as if it already operated fuel-efficient aircraft.   
 Similar to Appendix A, the argument and proof presented in this section is similar 




prohibitively expensive that the airline will choose never to exit.  Second, assume the 
only difference between the old and new aircraft is their fuel efficiency.  Furthermore, the 
fuel efficiency of the new aircraft is proportional to that of the older aircaft.  To 
continue, assume price and demand are non-stochastic, i.e., revenue is fixed. In additio , 
cost (fuel costs) follow the following Geometric Brownian Motion and have a 
convenience yield of δ.   
 dc = ρCdt + σCdz (1b) 
To make the problem more manageable, assume a depreciation rate of zero.  Lastly, the 
costs of operating the old aircraft are C, while the costs of operating the fuel- fficient 
aircraft is αC, where α are greater than zero and less than one.  
 Based on the above assumptions, the profits for an airline with an older fleet and 
the option to upgrade are: 
  CPold −=∏  (2b) 
 CPnew α−=∏   (3b) 
where (2b) are the profits for the airline that is operating an older fleet and (3b) are the 
profits for the airline once it has chosen to exercise its option and upgrade to a newer 
fleet.  
 By creating a replication portfolio, it can be shown that prior to exercising its 



















Thus, the value of the airline is 
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where β1 is the positive root to the quadratic equation which solves the general solution 
of Equation (4a).  The values of A and C*, the optimal fuel price at which the firm should 
invest, are to be determined.  The term 1βAC  represents the option to invest in the newer 
aircraft.   
To solve for A and C*, the “value-matching” and “smooth pasting” conditions are 
required.  That is:  
 
 Vo(C*) = Vn(C*)-I (7b) 
 
(C*) n V(C*) oV
′=′  (8b) 
where I is the investment cost of purchasing the fuel efficient aircraft.  
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A  (10b) 
First notice that A is positive, implying that the option to upgrade to a newer fleet 
increases the value of the airline.  Furthermore, the value of the real option is zero as fuel 
costs approach zero, thus implying there is little incentive to upgrade to a newer aircraft 




 Next I compare the level of fuel exposure for an airline with the option to upgrade 
to that of an airline operating a newer fleet.  The value of an airline with a newer fl et is 
Vnew, implying the value of the firm changes by 
δ
α−
, for a change in the price of jet fuel.  





1 −−AC .  When fuel prices 
approach zero, the difference in the value of the two airlines is 
δ
α )1( −−
 or the marginal 
fuel saving from operating a fuel-efficient fleet.  As fuel prices increase, the value of the 
option to upgrade increases, thus reducing the level of exposure for the airline with an 
older fleet.  The exposure for the airline with an older fleet continues to fall until the 
point at which the firm exercises its option to upgrade its fleet.  Based on the “smooth 
pasting condition,” Equation (8b), the exposure of the airline with the option will equal
that of the airline operating a newer fleet.   
 Figure 7 illustrates the above argument.  The lower, straight line reprsents the 
value to the old shareholders of the airline, which has exercised its option and invested in 
a newer fleet.  The second upper curve represents the value to the old shareholders of an 
airline, which has yet to exercise its option.  The upper curve declines rapidly when fuel 
prices are low.  When fuel prices are high, the slope of the curve is less and eventually 
converges with that of the airline that has exercised its option.  The point of convergence 
is where the airline exercises its option to upgrade. 
 Though this appendix has focused on the airline industry, the results are 
applicable to other studies gauging the effectiveness of operating hedging.  That is, a firm 
which does not utilize an operational hedge owns the option to do so.  Therefore, as the 




exercising its options, thus reducing the differences in exposures between those firms that 
use operational hedges and those that do not.  
FIGURE 7 





CHAPTER III  
 
 
OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL HEDGES; FRIEND OR FOE 
EVIDENCE FROM THE AIRLINES INDUSTRY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 There is inconsistency in the risk management literature regarding the extent to 
which firms use financial derivatives.  Some studies indicate that the use offinancial 
derivatives provides little protection to a firm’s cash flows (Guay and Kothari 2003).  
Other studies show that the use of financial derivatives is value-enhancing to the firm 
(Allayannis and Weston 2001; Mackay and Moeller 2007; Carter, Rogers, and Simkins 
2006), although this result is not conclusive (Jin and Jorion 2006).  Furthermore, most 
studies find that the use of financial derivatives reduces the firm’s overall risk exposure 
to the underlying asset being hedged (Allayannis and Ofek 2001; Hentschel and Kothari 
2001; Schrand 1997).  This inconsistency poses the question: how can an expensive risk 
management program reduce the overall risk of a firm and increase its value, but y t 
provide little protection to the firm’s cash flow. Guay and Kothari (2003) suggest  that 
the risk management program which uses both operational and financial hedges to 
manage a firm’s risk would be consistent with their and others’ findings that financial 
derivatives are only used to fine tune a firm’s overall risk management program.  
Furthermore, they conclude that the inconsistency mentioned above is driven by the 




This chapter examines the following: 1) if financial and operational hedges are 
substitutes or complements14 and; 2) whether the use of operational and financial hedges 
increases the value of the firm.  This chapter contributes to the literature conc rning the 
use of operational and financial hedges, and also examines whether hedging increases the 
firm’s value (Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston 2001; Kim, Mathur, and Nam 2006; Carter, 
Rogers, and Simkins 2006; Petersen and Thiagarajan 2000; Tufano 1998; Carter, 
Pantzalis, and Simkins 2006; Jin and Jorion 2006).  This study most closely follows 
Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001), who test whether the use of both financial and 
operational hedges protects multinational firms against exchange rate exposure.  Their 
study finds that multinational firms’ operational and financial hedges are complements 
rather than substitutes.  Allayannis, Ihrig and Weston’s conclude that a risk management 
policy which includes both operational and financial hedges enhances the value of the 
firm.  However, their results is not conclusive as other studies find that operational nd 
financial hedges are substitutes (Kim, Mathur, and Nam 2006; Petersen and Thiagarajan 
2000).  
 This essay differs from Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston’s (2001) article in that 
several different operational hedges are examined, while their article examines only the 
firm’s foreign operations as an operational hedge.  Furthermore, the sample for this study 
is restricted to the US airline industry.  Using a homogenous sample (the airlin  industry) 
controls for biases that occur when using a cross-section of industries.  For instance, it is 
difficult to discern which currencies a multinational firm is exposed to and the egree to 
which a firm uses financial and operational hedges to protect against those currencies to 
                                                
14 Operational and financial hedges are substitutes if the firm uses one to manage its risks and not the o r.  





which it is exposed.  Furthermore, as many multinational firms are conglomerates, the 
measurement for which Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001) use to proxy the 
relationship between a firm’s value and its hedging activity is biased because both the 
hedging behavior and the firm’s value vary across industries.  
 Similar to the Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001) study, I find evidence that 
financial and operational hedges are complements in the airline industry.  Contrary to the 
finding of other studies, the use of both operational hedges and financial hedges does not 
increase the value of the airline (Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston 2001; Kim, Mathur, and 
Nam 2006).  The evidence indicating a benefit exists in financial hedges is mixed. That is 
financial fuel derivatives increase the airlines value, while fuel contracts which lock in 
the price of fuel reduce the airlines value. Furthermore, the use of operational hedges 
alone actually reduces the value of the airline.  
 I examine three operational hedges used by airlines: 1) the diversity of its fleet, 2) 
the airline’s use of operating leases to manage its fleet, and 3) the use of fuel-efficient 
aircraft.  The diversity of an airline’s fleet and the use of a leased fleet give airlines the 
ability to respond quickly to changing market conditions by adjusting the number of seats 
flown.  A newer, fuel-efficient fleet protects the airline by reducing its exposure to the 
price of jet fuel. I find that airlines with diverse fleets tend to exhibit a gre ter use of 
financial hedges than do their counterparts.  The evidence also shows that a diverse fleet; 
a newer fuel-efficient fleet; and the use of operating leases all reduce an airline’s value.  
 The rest of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the literature.  Section 




the methodology and the procedures used in this chapter.  Section 3.5 presents the results 
of section 3.4. Section 3.6 concludes the essay.  
3.2 Literature Review   
 The objectives of this section are to examine the theoretical and empirical 
motivations for a firm to manage its risks.  The first part of this section reviews the 
seminal theories which show the benefits of risk management to the firm.  Next, I discuss 
the possible ways a firm can manage its risk, specifically the use of financial d 
operational hedging techniques.  Third, I review the empirical literature in regard to its 
support for and against theoretical justification for risk management.  Finally, I survey 
the empirical literature concerning whether risk management is value-enhancing to the 
firm.  
3.2.a Risk Management Theory 
 The purpose of this subsection is to review the prevailing theories concerning why 
firms use financial and/or operational hedges to manage their risk.  To summarize, there 
are currently four theories related to the hedging behavior of firms.  These four theories 
are that (1) firms exhibit a convex tax function (Smith and Stulz 1985) , (2) managers are 
risk averse (Smith and Stulz 1985), (3) financial distress and external capital are costly 
(Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993; Smith and Stulz 1985), and (4) hedging reduces 
asymmetric information and conveys information regarding management’s abilities 
(DeMarzo and Duffie 1995).  It is important to note that these theories are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive.  Thus, one or more hedging theories can provide possible 




let us first understand under what circumstances corporate hedging is irrelevant to the 
firm’s value. 
3.2.a.i Hedging Irrelevances 
 In a perfect market, the hedging practices of a firm are irrelevant to the firm’s 
value and hence, the current shareholder value.  A perfect market, as defined by Fama 
and Miller (1972), is one where there are no costs resulting from portfolio adjustment ; 
assets are infinitely divisible; firms and individuals have equal access to the capital 
markets; firms and individuals have no effect on the prevailing interest rate or asset 
prices; and investors are rational maximizing agents.  Though the perfect marke
assumptions are all that are needed to demonstrate the irrelevance of corporate hedging, 
three arguments with different assumptions will be presented to arrive at the sme 
conclusion.  As the perfect market assumptions are relaxed, each argument will provide
additional insight into why firms use financial derivatives to hedge their risks.  The 
arguments are the debt irrelevance proposition (Modigliani & Miller 1958), the use of 
State-Pricing Theory, and the Market Equilibrium approach (Fama and Miller 1972). 
 The Modigliani and Miller (1958) (MM) model was initially developed to prove 
the irrelevance of debt, yet the implications hold for a firm’s hedging strategy.  The basic 
principle governing the MM proposition of debt irrelevance follows:  If there are two 
similar firms, one of which is overpriced, an investor who owns the overpriced firm can 
sell his shares and use the proceeds, plus any additional financing, to purchase the other
firm.  The end result is more money at the same level of risk to the investor regardless of 




investors will move from the overpriced asset to the underpriced asset.  Thus, in 
equilibrium, the value of the two firms must be the same.  
 According to the MM model, the firm and investors are believed to act in a world 
with the following assumptions.  (1) Markets are frictionless (no transaction cost or 
taxes).  (2) Investors and managers share the same information regarding the f rm’s 
prospects.  (3) Individuals and firms can sell and buy similar claims at the same price.  
For instance, investors can borrow and lend at the same riskless interest rate as a firm.  
(4) There exist two firms with the same risk class.  This assumption assumes that the 
earnings of the two firms are perfectly correlated and proportional to each other.  (5) The 
firm’s goal is to maximize the value of its current claimholders. 
 Modigliani and Miller illustrate the irrelevance of hedging in a one-period model 
by assuming there are two firms, one which is hedged, Vh, and the other which is 
unhedged, Vu.  The hedged firm’s value is greater than the unhedged firm’s, Vh>Vu. The 
hedged and unhedged firm each have the same random operating cash flows, Xh=X u.  The 
hedged firm uses a put option with a current value of Ph to hedge its operating cash flow.  
A put option gives the owner of the option the right but not the obligation to sell the 
firm’s cash flow at the expiration of the option at a predetermined strike price K.  Thus, 
the equity holders of the hedged firm are guaranteed cash flows of max(Xh,K).  
Consequently, the cash flows of the hedged firm can be written as Xh=X s-max(K-Xh,0), 
where the first term is the shareholder earnings, max(Xh,K), and the second term is the 
value of the put contract at time of expiration.  The investor-expected income is 
X s=X h+Max(K-X h,0), which is the firm’s cash flows plus a put option.  Thus, the current 




will accrue to the shareholders, the stock price Sh, less the current value of a put option, 
Vh=Sh-Ph.  Lastly, an investor who has α percent of the hedged firm, will be entitled to an 
income of α(Xs)=α(X h+Max(K-X h,0)).  If the investor performs the following strategy, he 
will increase his income without incurring any additional risk.  The investor sells α 
percent of his ownership in the hedged firm for αSh.  He buys α put contracts, αPh.  The 
remainder of the funds is used to purchase α(Sh-Ph) dollars of the unhedged firm.  Recall, 
the value of the hedged firm is equal to the shareholder’s value less the put options, so 
our investor owns αVh dollars in the unhedged firm.  
 Continuing with the MM model, in the next period our investor’s income is 









. This is the same as α((Vh/Vu)X u  + Max(K-Xh,0)).  
Notice the investor’s income is greater than if he had remained in the hedged firm, since 
Vh>Vu and the firm’s cash flows are the same, Xh= u.  To see this more clearly, let’s 
compare the income from the strategy above to the income the investor would have 
received if he had remained in the hedged firm, α((Vh/Vu)X u + Max(K-Xh,0)) and 
α(Xh+Max(K-X h,0)) respectively.  Dropping the terms α and the Max(K-Xh,0) from both 
incomes, since they are the same, the remaining terms are, (Vh/Vu)X u and Xh.  Observe 
that the income from the strategy above is greater than if the investor had not 
implemented the strategy, since the value of the hedged firm is greater than the value of 
the unhedged firm, Vh/Vu>1.  So the income from this strategy is greater than if the 
investor had remained in the unhedged firm, assuming X is never negative15.  Similarly, it 
can be shown that if Vu>Vh, investors will sell their share in the unhedged firm to 
                                                
15 It is reasonable to assume XI is never negative in a one-period model, where the inv stor has limited 
liability since the investor will never be required to invest more money in the firm to make up for the firm’s 




purchase the hedged firm.  Thus, in equilibrium, the value of the unhedged firm must 
equal the value of the hedged firm.  In summary, since the two firms are of the same ri k 
class, and thus have the same resulting end-of-period operating cash flow, the value of 
the hedged and unhedged firm must be the same or there will be arbitrage opportunities. 
 This same logic can be applied to futures contracts, call options, or any other 
tradeable contract used to hedge a firm’s risk.  Even further, the same analysis c n be 
performed on parts of the firm’s operating cash flows.  To elaborate, in the above 
example, I assumed the firm was hedging all of its earning; however, a firm might want 
to hedge its exposure to a particular commodity or currency.  Yet even under these 
scenarios, the firm value is independent of its hedging policy. 
 Another way to view the irrelevance of hedging is through State-Pricing Theory. 
State-Pricing Theory assumes that markets are competitive, frictionless, and complete.  
The assumption of competitive markets assumes that individuals and firms are price 
takers, and thus any one individual or firm is unable to affect the price of a primitive asset 
through its actions.  Frictionless markets imply no transaction cost or taxes.  Th se 
assumptions also imply no asymmetric information or agency cost.  The complete arket 
says the state space is spanned by the available assets.  
To illustrate the irrelevance proposition under State Pricing Theory, I use a proof 
similar to that of Fama and Miller (1972).  First, assume that the price of each Arrow-
Debreu security is pi and the firm will be liquidated in the next period with a total payout 
of Xi.  The subscript i represents the possible states.  For simplicity, let’s assume that Xi 




Under the State Pricing Theory, the current value of the firm is the price fo  a 
dollar if state i occurs multiplied by the firm’s payoff for the corresponding state, 
summed over all states. 
 




ii RpXpV λ1 . (3.1) 
A firm decides to hedge against state j, which is a subset of state i.  That is, the firm will 
buy a contract that pays a certain amount if state j occurs.  For instance, suppose the firm 
decides to buy a put contract with a strike price of K.  Then the value of the firm can be 
written as two parts:  the value belonging to the equity holders less the put contracts.   
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ii RpXpV λ1  
Where j is the states in which K is greater or equal to the firm’s income (Rj(1-λ)).  From 
this equation, it is observed that the value of the put cancels out, resulting in the value of 
the hedged firm being the same as that of the unhedged firm.  Obviously, this exampl  is 
not restricted to put contracts but can be applied to any financial contract.  
 A less restrictive explanation of the irrelevance of hedging is explained by Fama 
and Miller’s (1972)  Market Equilibrium Model.  Under this model, the only assumption 
is that markets are perfect.  Perfect markets means that managers and investors are 
rational, information is accurate, and markets are frictionless, competitive, and efficient.  
Under these assumptions, there are no taxes, individuals and firms have the same 
financial arrangements, investors are indifferent between buying a security from a firm 
versus from an individual where the security is backed by the firm’s assets, inve tors are 




claimholders’ wealth.  Thus, the MM assumption that there is a firm with the same 
“business risk” and the State-Pricing Theory assumption that markets are complete is 
relaxed.  In this model, firms, owners, and employees determine the price of labor, 
capital, and investment simultaneously.  In this case, a firm issuing a claim ag inst its 
probability distribution can be mimicked exactly by investors.  For example, suppose an 
unhedged firm decides to hedge some of its risk.  Investors who currently own the firm 
and who prefer the firm to remain unhedged will sell their claims against the firm such 
that their payoff is the same as if the firm remained unhedged.  The result is that investors 
are indifferent to the actions of the firm’s financing policies.  Similarly, investors who 
own an unhedged firm yet desire the payoff of a hedged firm will issue claims against 
their ownership in the firm, such that their payoffs are the same as if the firm were 
hedged.  The result is that investors can issue personal securities derived from the fir ’s 
assets to produce the desired payoff distribution.  Thus, investors are indifferent to the 
firm’s financing decision. 
 In conclusion, this subsection has shown that in a world of perfect markets, the 
hedging policies of a firm have no effect on the current claimholders of the company.  
This assertion has been demonstrated using the MM, State-Pricing Theory, and Market 
Equilibrium models.  However, what role, if there is one, does hedging take when the 
assumptions of perfect markets are relaxed?  Hedging can take a positive role when the 
assumption of taxes is relaxed, when it is costly for a particular class of claimholders or 
stakeholders to protect themselves from expropriation, when managers do not maximize 
the value of the current claimholders, and when investors and managers do not have 




value: (1) if the firm faces a convex tax regime (Smith and Stulz 1985); (2) if there exist 
bankruptcy costs or if access to external capital is restricted or relatively more expensive 
than internal funds (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993; Smith and Stulz 1985); (3) by 
providing a method for managers to maximize the firm’s value and their personal utility 
(Smith and Stulz 1985); and (4) by providing valuable information about the quality of 
the firm’s management (DeMarzo and Duffie 1995).  The next section develops these 
theories in more detail. 
3.2.a.ii Taxes 
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Graham and Smith (1999) show that if a firm has a 
convex tax function, then it is advantageous for the firm to consider hedging some of its 
risk exposure.  The logic is that a firm can reduce its expected taxes by payinga little 
more or no additional taxes when cash flow is low and significantly less taxes during
periods when cash flow is abundant.  The net effect is an increase in the expected value 
of the firm. 
Grahman and Rogers (2002) illustrate this point numerically.  First, assume that a 
firm’s tax function is 0% if the firm’s profits are 0 or less and 40% if the profits are 
greater than zero.  The before tax profits are $-50 or $100 with a 50% probability. The 
expected profits before taxes are 25 (100*0.5 + -50*0.5). The firm’s after-tax profits are 
-50 or 60.  This leaves the firm with an expected after-tax profit of 5.  If the firm decides 
to hedge such that its profits before taxes are always 25, then it’s after-tax profits are 
consistently 15 (25*0.6).  Obviously, any risk averse investor would prefer 15 dollars 




Smith and Stulz’s (1985) proof of this argument is as follows, assuming a       
two-period model:  the current value of the firm is V and the risk-neutral probabilities 
and pretax cash flow from operations for state i are pi, and Xi, respectively
16.  For 
simplicity, assume the following: (1) that the firm chooses a hedging strategy such that 
cash flows from its operations and its hedging strategy are equal to the expected cash 
flows from its operations; (2) the risk-free rate of return is zero. 
The value of the firm in state i is: 
 
( )( )iXiXiV τ−= 1  (3.3) 
Where τ(X i) is a convex function of income.  
The first and second derivatives of the firm’s end-of-period value with respect to 
income show that the firm’s value is an increasing and concave function of income. 
 




















The first derivative is positive since it is assumed a firm would not accept an 
additional dollar of income if that dollar lowered the overall value of the firm.  The
second derivative is less than zero because τ′ and τ″ are both positive. 
From Jensen’s inequality, the value of the hedged firm is greater than the value of 
the unhedged firm.  This is illustrated in the equation below. 
                                                
16 Note: the relationship between the risk neutral probabilities and state prices are Pi= pi / (1+rf ), where Pi , 
pi and rf are the risk neutral probabilities, state prices, and risk-free rate respectively.  Thus, this same 










From the equation above, notice that the difference between the hedged firm and the
unhedged firm is the expected taxes the firm pays, with the hedged firm’s expected taxes 
being less.  Thus hedging increases the value of the firm by reducing the taxes it pays.  
3.2.a.iii Financial Distress Cost 
If costs are associated with financial distress, then it could be advisable for a 
value-maximizing firm to hedge.  The logic is that when a firm is in financial distress, it 
experiences avoidable deadweight cost.  These costs include legal fees and lost 
managerial and employee productivity associated with financial distress.  By hedging, a 
firm can avoid these costs and thus increase the value of the firm.  
Smith and Stulz’s (1985) proof that hedging can increase the value of a firm by 
reducing financial distress cost is as follows: let (1) Dk be the interest paid on debt; (2) pi, 
the state price for state i; (3) Hi, the hedge payoff for state i; (4) Ci, the financial distress 
cost for state i; and “g” (“b”) represent the states where the firm is not (is) in default of its 
debt.  That is Xi > F for state “g” and Xi < F for state “b” where F is the face value of 
debt.  Assume the bond holders take possession of the firm in default. Lastly, assume  
two-period model.  
 Smith and Stulz’s proof shows that the value of a leveraged firm is: 
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Subtracting the value of the Vh  and Vuh, results in the following equation:  
 






Observe, from this equation, that the hedged firm’s value is greater than the value of 
unhedged firm if financial distress costs are greater than the lost tax shield associated 
with bankruptcy.  However, as Graham and Rogers (2002) observe, increasing the firm’s 
debt results in a greater debt tax shield, which increases the benefits of hedging (Dk-X i 
gets smaller as Dk rises).  If it is assumed that the firm’s income is still taxed in default, 
then the first term drops out and the value from hedging is the present value of the 
financial distress costs.  Note, from the above analysis, the benefit of hedging is 
independent of the firm’s investment policy.  
 Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) extend the argument of financial distress cost 
by directly incorporating this cost into the firm’s cost for external capital.  The 
significance of this argument is that it increases the incentive for the firm to use and 
protect internal cash for investments.  The authors show how the interrelationship 
between a firm’s cash flows and its investment opportunities create an incentive for the 
firm to hedge its cash flows.  Intuitively, their argument consists of showing that it is 
advantageous for a firm to hedge if it is characterized as having to forgo its most 
profitable investments when its cash flows are low, yet is faced with relatively low 
profitable investments when its cash flows are high.  From this argument, it is beneficial 




opportunities are low to those periods when cash flows are low but  the return on 
investments is the highest.  
 Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) formally prove their argument by assuming 
the following: the cost of external funds is greater than the cost of internal funds (C(e)).  
Furthermore, the cost of external funds is increasing and convex (Ce(e) > 0, Cee(e) > 0).  
“C(e)” is defined as the cost of external funds and “e” is the amount of external cash 
used.  The amount invested, “I,” is the sum of the firm’s internal cash and external cash (I
= w+e).  The firm’s internal cash, “w,” is equal to w0ε (w=w0ε), where w0 is the last 
period’s internal capital and ε is a normal random variable with mean 1 and a variance of 
σ2. Next assume the payoff of the firm’s investments (θf(I)) is an increasing, concave 
function with respect to the amount invested ( ) 0(I)fθ ,0Ifθ <′′>′ ). “θ,” which represents 
the relationship between the firm’s investment opportunities and its cash flows, is equal 
to ( 1)( +− εεα ). “α” represents the correlation between the firm’s investment 
opportunities and its cash flows.  For instance, a positive α mplies the firm’s investment 
opportunities are high when its cash level is high.  The next assumption is that the value 
of the firm as a function of its investments is V(I) = θf(I) – I – C(e).17  These three pivotal 
assumptions concerning a firm’s motivation to hedge are (1) the differential cost between 
external funds and internal cash; (2) the firm’s increasing and concave investments 
function; and (3) the degree of correlation between the firm’s investment opportunities 
and its cash level.  
 Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein’s (1993) proof continues by first stating that the 
objective of the firm is to maximize its value with respect to investments.  From this 
                                                




assumption the first order condition is ( ) eI C1Iθf =− .  That is, the firm will continue to 
invest until the marginal return from its investments is equal to the marginal cost of 
external funds.  Assume that the level of investment is decreasing with the amount of 
external funds used, as it is more costly for the firm to gain additional funds from the 
capital markets.  This assumption implies that investment is increasing with the amount 






 Lastly, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein’s proof shows under what circumstances the 
firm’s value is concave with respect to the random shocks to its cash flow (ε).  Before 
continuing, note that by Jensen’s equality, it is optimal for the firm to hedge (not hedge) 
when its expected value is concave (convex) with respect to the underlying risk.  Thus, 
by taking the derivative of the firm’s value with respect to the random shock and using 
the first order condition, the first derivative of the firm, evaluated at ε’s mean can be 
written as: 
 







 This equation implies that the second derivative of the firm’s value with respect to the 



























.  (3.11) 
The second derivative of the firm’s value is negative when α is non-positive since the 
firm’s investment function is increasing and convex.  This equation shows that when cash 
flows are negatively correlated with a firm’s investment opportunities, its value is 




value.  Conversely, if α is positive, it is possible for the value of the firm to be convex 
with respect to changes in its cash flows.  This result implies that hedging is detrimental 
to the firm’s value.  Note, it is assumed that investments are increasing with the firm’s 





).  This assumption is not true under all scenarios.  Under such 
circumstances, when investment drops as internal cash rises, it may be optimal for the 
firm to overhedge.  
To further understand the previous equation (the second derivative of the firm’s 











1(I)Iαf ) the relationship between the firm’s 
investment opportunities and fluctuations in its cah flow.  To illustrate, the value of an 
oil company’s investments decline as its cash flow declines, since both the value of the 
unproven oil reserves and profits from current production decline with the price of oil 
(Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993).  However, the opposite case is predicted for an 
airline, where the value of its investments increases with the decline in its cash holdings, 
since aircraft are sold below their intrinsic value during industry recessions (Pulvino 
1998).  The second term in the second derivative of the irm’s investment function 
represents the benefits from hedging regardless of the correlation between the firm’s 
investment set and its cash flows. The significance of this term is that when prices are 
low, the firm has to forgo profitable investments as c sh is scarce.  Yet when prices are 
favorable, the marginal benefit of the next investment is low since the best investments 
have already been implemented.   





 Managers who are unable to use the other venues such a  capital markets to 
maximize their utility will use the firm as a vehicle to optimize their personal utility.  The 
hedging practices of a firm are determined by the degree to which its managers are risk 
averse and the compensation packages of those managers.  For instance, a manager 
whose compensation is performance based might find he firm’s volatility unacceptable.  
This manager can use hedging as a means to reduce the volatility of his compensation 
plan to an acceptable level.       
 To understand this more fully, I use Smith and Stulz’s (1985) proof  to examine 
two scenarios.  In the first scenario the manager’s wealth is a concave function of the 
firm’s value.  An example is a compensation plan that is capped at a certain amount 
regardless of the firm’s performance.  Assume the manager experiences a concave utility 
function with respect to wealth, that is, he is risk averse.  By taking the first and second 
derivatives of the manager’s utility function with respect to the firm’s value, it is 
observed that the manager’s utility function is increasing and concave with respect to the 























By Jensen’s inequality, the manager’s utility evaluated at the expected value of the firm 
is greater than his expected utility.  
 ( )( )[ ] [ ]( )( )VEwUVwUE ≤  (3.13) 
Therefore, the manager will optimize his utility bychoosing a hedging policy such that 
V i+Hi = E[V], where Vi (Hi) is the value of the firm (the hedge) in each state “i."  
 To understand the logic to the previous analysis, suppose a manager faces a 




Under this example, the manager has limited upside risk yet is completely exposed to the 
firm’s downside risk.  Thus, the manager is better off if he / she uses the firm to hedge 
the downside risk.  
 The second scenario is more interesting.  Again, suppose the manager faces a 
concave utility function, yet his wealth is a weakly convex function with respect to the 
firm’s value. 
 

















By taking the first and second derivatives of the manager’s utility function with respect to 
the firm’s value, it is observed that the manager’s utility function can be concave or 
convex with respect to the firm’s value.  
Thus, the manager will choose to hedge in some instances and not to hedge in other 
instances.  
 To illustrate, suppose a manager’s wealth consists of the firm’s stock.  Under this 
compensation plan, the manager’s wealth is a linear function of the firm’s value, which 
implies that his utility is a concave function of the firm’s value.  Thus the manager will 
choose to hedge.  Now suppose the manager’s wealth consists of stock options.  Under 
this case, the manager does not hedge if the options are deep-out-of-the-money or          
at-the-money.  The reasoning is that the manager’s utility is a convex function with 
respect to the firm’s value.  The logic is that the manager’s downside risk is capped, yet 


























manager’s compensation plan becomes more linear, resembling a stock-based 
compensation plan.  Thus, the manager will choose t implement a hedging policy.  
 If managers are risk averse, a firm’s hedging policy can add value to the firm by 
leaving the optimal investment policy unchanged.  A risk averse manager who is unable 
to hedge his risk might choose to forgo risky positive net present value projects for less 
risky and less valuable net present value projects.  This behavior can be very costly to the 
firm.   
 DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) show that there is an incentive for managers to hedge 
as it conveys information to shareholders about their abilities.  This information allows 
shareholders to develop compensation packages which reflect their manager’s 
performance.  The basic intuition of DeMarzo and Duffie’s (1995) argument is that 
managers, through hedging, can reduce the volatility of he firm’s cash flows (profits), 
which is not reflective of their performance.  
 To give a numerical example of why managers would vo unteer such information 
concerning their performance, suppose the following: a manager has a utility function 
which is increasing and concave with respect to his wage.  More explicitly, his utility 
function is equal to his wage “w” when his wage is below two.  When his wage is greater 
than or equal to two, his utility is two.  The manager’s wage is a function of the firm’s 
profits.  For simplicity, assume that the manager’s future wages are 80% of the firm’s 
profits.  Also, the firm’s future profits are equal to the manager’s ability “a” plus a 
random hedgeable risk “ε,” the outcome of which is unknown to shareholders.  The 
shareholders and managers know the distribution of “a,” which takes on the value of 2 




which takes on the values of 1 and -1 with equal probability.  Thus, the possible profits 
for the firm are (3, 2, 1, 0) with equal probability.  However, since the shareholders don’t 
know the distribution of  “ε,” they are unable to discern the proportions of the firm’s 
profits that are attributed to the manager’s performance and that are from the random 
hedgeable risk18.  
The manager wants to maximize his future expected utility, which is based on the 
firm’s profits.  The manager’s expected utility when he doesn’t hedge is 1.1 (0.25(2) + 
0.25(1.6) + 0.25(0.8) + 0.25(0.0)).  If the manager d cides to hedge then his expected 
utility is 1.2 (0.5(1.6) + 0.5(0.8)), which is determined by his ability “a” and not the 
random hedgeable risk factor “ε.”  From the above illustration, it is obvious our manager 
is better off hedging, which will yield him an expect d utility of 1.2 rather than 1.1.  
Thus, managers are willing to provide information cerning their performance, as it 
gives them greater utility.  
 3.2.b Financial vs. Operational Hedging 
 The previous subsection implies that hedging is a me ns to reduce the volatility of 
a firm’s present and future cash flows; thus the goal of a financial or operational hedge is 
to meet this objective.  To meet this objective, th firm uses financial hedges such as 
interest rates, currency, and commodity derivatives and/or operational hedges, which 
stem from the operating and investment activities of the firm.  In this subsection, the 
empirical literature concerning the use of financial versus operational hedging is 
discussed, specifically, the financial and operational hedges available to the firm, 
                                                
18 DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) that assume the distribuion of the hedgeable risk is known to shareholders 
but the degree to which the firm is exposed is unknown.  Here “ε” captures both the hedgeable risk factor 




and whether the firm uses these hedges as a means to reduce risk.  Lastly, this subsection 
discusses whether financial and operational hedges are complements or substitutes.  
Many financial contracts can be used to hedge or protect against a particular risk.  
The most obvious is the use of derivatives; however, th re are others such as the use of 
debt and cash (usually referred to as hedging substit te ).  For example, a firm can reduce 
the risk of financial distress by simply reducing its debt level.  However, debt provides a 
tax shield for the firm, which suggests that it is optimal for a firm to increase its debt tax 
shield through the use of debt and use other means to control the volatility of its cash 
flows (Stulz 1996). Graham and Rogers (2002) find just that: firms use financial 
derivatives as a means to increase their debt capacity.  
Another example of  debt used as a financial hedge when the debt is denominated 
in a foreign currency and is used to hedge against foreign revenue (Allayannis and Ofek 
2001; Geczy, Minton, and Schrand 1997).  Consistent with this notion that foreign debt is 
used as a hedge, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find the percentage of a firm’s foreign sales 
to total sales is a positive predictor of the amount of foreign debt a firm incurs.  Not 
limited to currency hedging, the type of debt a firm chooses can protect its cash flow 
from interest rate risk (Faulkender 2005) by matching interest sensitive assets to similar 
liabilities.  For instance, if the cash flow generat d from a firm’s assets is positively 
correlated with interest rates, then the firm should finance those assets with short term 
debt (i.e., the firm’s interest payments are the highest (lowest) when cash flow from the 
asset is its highest (lowest)).   
A firm’s cash holding is a substitute for the use of financial derivatives.  Recall 




financial distress cost and to avoid the risk associated with lost investments.  A firm can 
reduce the probability of financial distress and/or guarantee its investments by holding 
excess cash (Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell 2007).  Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 
(2004) find evidence supporting the hypothesis that fin ncially constrained firms use cash 
as a means to protect their investments.  The authors find that financially constrained 
firms increase their cash holdings in response to an increase in the firm’s cash flow.  
While no such relationship holds for financially unco strained firms, they also find that 
financially constrained firms’ cash-holdings-to-total-assets are significantly greater than 
those of unconstrained firms.  Similarly, Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) find that 
cash-heavy firms in industries characterized as having high product market rivalry 
increase investments during unfavorable times when t ir financially constrained rivals 
are unable to invest.  The authors also find that te probability of using swap contracts 
declines as cash holdings increase, suggesting that cash and derivatives are substitutes. 
Other financial contracts also reduce a firm’s financi l distress cost and hence the 
need to hedge.  One cost associated with financial distress is the cost related to conflicts 
between shareholders and bondholders (agency cost). For instance, shareholders will 
choose highly risky projects or forgo positive net present value projects at the expense of 
bondholders.  A firm can reduce this cost with debt covenants, convertible debt, preferred 
stock, and dividend policies (Nance, Smith, and Smithson 1993).  
Operational hedges are a consequence of the real options a firm owns.  The 
different types of real options are too numerous to lis ; however, a commonality of real 
options is to give the owner of the option the ability to delay decision-making until more 




operational hedge, consider a firm that is planning to expand into a new market.  The firm 
has the choice to build one large plant today or construct one smaller plant with an option 
to expand the plant later.  The larger plant, if bult, would cause the firm financial distress 
if market conditions turned sour, thus, affecting the firm’s ability to invest in profitable 
projects in later periods.  A smaller plant would protect the firm from any such adverse 
conditions.  
The manufacturing facilities of a multinational firm located in foreign markets is 
an example of a real option providing an operational hedge against currency fluctuations.  
The hedge is provided since production cost and revenue are denominated in the same 
currency.  Another advantage of a firm’s having multiple foreign facilities is the 
switching option that it provides (Triantis 2000).  For instance, if the dollar increases in 
value relative to the foreign currency, then a US firm can switch its production from a 
domestic factory to the foreign facility, and thus protect itself from the appreciating dollar 
and at the same time exploit the cheaper foreign currency. 
A firm’s ability to adjust output and thus cost is another important real option that 
functions as an operational hedge.  For instance, as describe by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), 
a mine owns the option to suspend operations if the pric  of the commodity drops below 
a certain threshold and later reopen when conditions improve.  A firm which has this 
option to adjust its production, versus a firm where p oduction is fixed (or at least its 
costs are), can protect its cash flows by guaranteeing a nonnegative profit.   
Several studies examine whether there is empirical evidence that a firm’s foreign 
operations provide an operational hedge against currency risk (Allayannis, Ihrig, and 




Williamson 2001). Williamson (2001) finds that Japanese automotive manufacturers 
experienced less exposure to the dollar in the lattr part of his sample period.  He 
attributes this decrease to the increase in foreign automobiles manufactured in the US. 
More specifically, the exposure of Japanese automakers to the dollar declines as the 
percent of foreign cars produced in the US increases.  However, this decline in exposure 
is insignificant for 5 out of 7 firms.  Williamson,  as with most other studies, measures a 
firm’s risk exposure as the regression coefficient from a two factor market model. 
Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001) find that operational hedges do not reduce a 
firm’s risk exposure.  They hypothesize that the grater the number of geographic regions 
a firm’s subsidiaries are located in, the greater is its operational hedge.  However, the 
authors are unable to find a negative and significant relationship between a firm’s 
geographic dispersion and its exposure to currency rates.  Their measure of geographic 
dispersion is a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index. Contrary to Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston  
(2001),  Pantzalis, Simkins, and Laux’s (2001) results show that the number of regions a 
firm has subsidiaries in is a significant factor in educing a firm’s risk to currency 
fluctuation.  
Carter, Pantzalis, and Simkins (2006) examine whether multinational firms with 
greater geographic dispersion are less (more) exposd during adverse (favorable) 
conditions.  Their findings suggest that widely dispersed multinational firms that are 
positively exposed to the appreciation of the dollar (typical of importers) do experience 
significant (insignificant) exposure to the dollar during strong (weak) dollar states.  




geographic dispersion is not a significant determinant of their exposure in either weak or 
strong dollar states.    
 Some empirical studies show that a firm’s real option o adjust its production is an 
operational hedge (Kallapur and Eldenburg 2005; Haush lter, Heron, and Lie 2002; 
Petersen and Thiagarajan 2000; Tufano 1998).  Tufano (1998) finds some evidence that 
real options are used to lower a gold mining firm’s exposure to gold prices.  As 
mentioned above, a mine has the option to suspend production if the price of gold drops 
below a certain threshold.  This type of real option has the characteristics of a call option.  
Therefore, Tufano (1998) predicts that if gold mining firms are utilizing their real 
options, then, their exposure to gold prices should fal  as the volatility of gold prices 
increases.  Furthermore, as with call options, a gold mining firm’s exposure to gold prices 
increases with the gold lease rate and decreases with the 10-year Treasury Bill because 
the gold lease rate represents the convenience yield of gold and the 10-year Treasury Bill 
is the risk free rate.  As predicted, Tufano (1998) finds that the volatility of gold prices 
and the interest rate on a 10-year Treasury Bill do significantly reduce a gold mining 
firm’s exposure to gold prices.  However, there is not a positive relationship between the 
lease gold rate and a mine’s exposure to gold prices.   
 Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) look at the hedging behavior of two distinct gold 
mining firms: one firm which uses financial derivati es extensively and the other that 
does not.  They find that the operating cost of the firm which does not use financial 
derivatives (Homestake Mining) falls with declining gold prices.  This is not true for the 
firm which hedges (American Barrick). They contend that Homestake Mining’s ability to 




mines with higher operating costs and vary the mix of ore extracted.  American Barrick’s 
ability to adjust production is more restricted. 
 If real options are used as operational hedges, thn firms will seek risk-reducing 
technology if the uncertainty of their environment increases.  Kallapur and Eldenburg 
(2005) find this to be the case.  After a change in Medicare policy which increased the 
uncertainty concerning payment, hospitals attempted to reduce their risk by replacing 
high fixed cost / low variable cost equipment with higher variable cost / low fixed cost 
equipment.  That is, hospitals chose a production function that consisted of higher 
variable cost with the option to adjust production during unfavorable times.  
 Are the uses of financial and operational hedges sub titutes or complements?  
That is, are financial and operational hedges substit tes which a firm can use 
interchangeably, or do financial and operational hedges protect the firm against different 
risks and thus complement each other?  For instance, sev ral authors have suggested that 
operational hedges (financial hedges) are used to pro ect against long (short) term risks 
(Carter, Pantzalis, and Simkins 2006; Triantis 2000).  The Petersen and Thiagarajan 
(2000) study suggests that financial and operational hedges are substitutes.  More 
specifically, one reason Homestake chose not to use financial derivatives was its ability 
to adjust operating costs in response to movements in gold prices; American Barrick 
doesn’t have this luxury.  To explicitly test the question of substitutes  versus 
complements, Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001) hypothesize that if operational and 
financial hedges are substitutes (complements) then the probability of a firm’s using 
financial derivatives decreases (increases) with its geographic dispersion index because 




operational hedge.  The authors find a positive and significant relationship between the 
probability that a firm uses derivatives and its geo raphic dispersion index, thus, 
suggesting financial and operational hedges are complements.  
3.2.c Motivation for Hedging (Empirical Results) 
 The previous two subsections discussed the theoretical motivations for hedging 
and two distinct types of hedges, financial and operational.  This subsection discusses the 
empirical findings in support of the different theor tical motivations for hedging. More 
specifically, does the empirical evidence suggest that firms hedge to reduce their tax 
burden,  reduce financial distress cost, maximize their managers utility (Smith and Stulz 
1985), protect their most profitable investment opportunities (Froot, Scharfstein, and 
Stein 1993), and reduce the asymmetric information between managers and shareholders 
(DeMarzo and Duffie 1995). 
3.2.c.i Taxes 
 Recall that hedging can enhance the firm’s value if a firm experiences a convex 
tax function (Smith and Stulz 1985).  Many authors have suggested the use of a dummy 
variable to indicate whether the firm incurred net operating loss carryback and 
carryforward (NOL) as a proxy if a firm hedges in response to the convexity of its tax 
function (Allayannis and Ofek 2001; Geczy, Minton, a d Schrand 1997; Nain 2004; 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson 1993; Tufano 1996).  Thereason is that a firm’s marginal 
tax rate changes when its taxable income is zero, as a firm does not pay taxes when its 
taxable income is nonpositive.  This argument implies that firms with near zero taxable 
income should experience the greatest convexity in their tax functions.  Since carryback 




use NOL as a proxy for the convexity of a firm’s tax function.  Contrary to prediction, 
these authors have found that a firm’s decision to use financial derivatives is not 
significantly determined by NOL, suggesting that the convexity of a firm’s tax function is 
not a motivating factor for the use of financial derivatives.  
A problem with using NOL as a proxy for whether a firm’s tax function is 
convex, as shown by Graham and Smith (1999), is that carryback and carryforward 
actually reduces the convexity of a firm’s tax-function at the point where taxable income 
is near zero.  The reason is that carryback and carryforward smooth a firm’s losses over 
several periods, thus reducing the expected present value of a firm’s taxable income.  
Graham and Smith (1999) show that using a firm’s simulated tax liabilities, firms with a 
tax saving in the 90th – 95th percentile would save on average $134,410 from hedging.  
However, this number is relatively small when compared to Brown’s (2001) annual 
estimated cost of a hedging program of $1.5 million.  Further evidence against the 
convex-tax hypothesis is offered by Graham and Rogers (2002), who find the expected 
tax savings obtained from hedging are not a significant motivating factor in the firm’s 
decision to utilize financial derivatives.  The authors do find that a firm’s hedging 
increases a firm’s debt tax shield.  
3.2.c.ii Financial Distress and the Underinvestment Problem 
 As mentioned earlier, financial distress costs are the costs that occur when a firm 
reaches bankruptcy.  These costs can be direct or indirect, such as lawyer fees or lost 
employee productivity (e.g., employees using company time to seek new employment). A 
firm can reduce these costs by lowering its debt level or protecting its cash flow through 




by such common ratios as debt to assets, quick ratio, and EBIT to interest, tend to hedge.  
However, several studies find this relationship to be insignificant to a firm’s risk 
management decision (Allayannis and Ofek 2001; Allayannis and Weston 1999; Geczy, 
Minton, and Schrand 1997; Nain 2004; Nance, Smith, and Smithson 1993; Tufano 1996).  
An issue with the above studies is that there is no control for the fact that a firm’s 
hedging policy along with its degree of financial leverage are jointly determined (Stulz 
1996).  For instance, a firm with a high probability of bankruptcy is better off “betting the 
farm,” as the shareholders have little to lose.  Under this scenario, hedging caps the 
upside potential of the firm.  Yet a firm with litte chance of bankruptcy will choose a risk 
management policy that allows the firm to increase its leverage and thus exploit the debt 
tax shield.  Graham and Rogers (2002) use a simultaneous equation regression to control 
for such endogeneity and find a positive relationship between a firm’s hedging activity 
and its debt to asset ratio.  Furthermore, they estimate that the median firm saves $9.8 
million dollars in taxes from hedging due to the increase in debt capacity.   
 Another major cost associated with financial distre s and external financing is 
agency costs, which stem from the conflicts between th  different claimholders of the 
firms.  For instance, one source of agency cost is that shareholders will forgo positive net 
present value projects or invest in risky projects at the expense of the bondholder (Myers 
1977).  To compensate bondholders for this risk, shareholders must pay a higher rate of 
return on borrowed funds than if those funds were from internal sources.  This situation 
creates a differential between the cost of the funds from external and those from internal 
sources.  This differential along with the concavity of the firm’s investment function and 




value enhancing incentive for the firm to hedge (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993)19.  
Thus, a firm with large growth opportunities and a significant cost differential between 
internal and external funds is characterized as having a high market to book ratio and 
significant R&D expenditures, as each proxy for the firm’s growth potential and agency 
cost, respectively.  Studies have found a positive relationship between a firm’s propensity 
to hedge and its market to book ratio and R&D expenditures (Allayannis and Ofek 2001; 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand 1997; Nance, Smith, and Smithson 1993; Allayannis and 
Weston 1999).  However, other studies have found the opposite relationship.  For 
instance, Graham and Rogers (2002) find that firms with large R&D spending tend to 
hedge less.  Furthermore, Tufano (1996) finds an inverse relationship between the 
exploration activities of a gold mining firm and its level of hedging.  
3.2.c.iii Manager Risk Aversion & Asymmetric information 
 Recall that risk averse managers will hedge the firm’s cash flow if their 
compensation package is concave or linear with respect to the value of the firm (Smith 
and Stulz 1985).  Thus, there should be a relationship between a firm’s hedging behavior 
and its managers’ compensation package.  More specifically, managers whose wealth 
consists largely of the company’s stock are more lik ly to implement a risk management 
policy for the firm, as these managers are unable to fully diversify their personal wealth 
and furthermore, their wealth is a linear function of the firm’s value.  Conversely, firms 
whose managers have a significant number of stock options are less likely to hedge as the 
wealth of these managers tends to be convex with respect to the value of the firm.  
                                                
19 There is a difference between the underinvestment according to Myers (1977) and to Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein (1993).  With Myers (1977),  shareholders choose not to invest, even when they can, since any 
gains will accrue to the bondholders.  With Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), the underinvestment 




However, Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find the probability that a firm uses 
financial derivatives is not affected by the amount of wealth its managers and directors 
have invested in the firm.  They measure the managers’ and directors’ invested interest in 
the firm by their stock holdings and stock options.  However, three problems with their 
proxy for the risk aversion of managers are (1) the value of the stock and options 
holdings which managers and directors have invested in the firm is correlated with the 
size of the firm, as larger firms typically have larger managing staff; (2) the hedging 
decision resides with the CEO of the firm and not necessarily its directors; and (3) it 
doesn’t account for whether the options are deep in-the-money (options that are deep in 
the money behave more like common stock). 
 Tufano (1996)  and Graham and Rogers (2002) address some of the above 
concerns regarding the Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) study.  They find some 
evidence that risk averse managers are a motivating factor for a firm’s decision to hedge. 
In their study, Graham and Rogers (2002) use the delta and vega of the CEO’s holding in 
the firm as proxies for how sensitive a manager’s wealth is to changes in the firm’s value.  
The delta is defined as the percent change in the value of the CEO’s stocks and options to 
a one percent change in the firm’s stock price.  Vega is defined as the percent change in 
the CEO option holdings to a one percent change in the standard deviation of the stock 
returns.  Their study shows a positive and significant (at the 10% level) relationship 
between a firm’s use of derivatives and the manager’s d lta.  This is as predicted since a 
delta closer to one implies that the options behave in a way similar to stocks.  The vega, 
however, is insignificantly related to the firm’s hedging decision.  Tufano, using similar 




to hedge. Furthermore, Tufano addresses some of theconcerns mentioned above (size of 
managerial staff).  He finds, as predicted, a positive relationship between the per capita 
stock holding of the four top executives and the firm’s decision to hedge.  Furthermore, 
the firm’s decision to hedge decreases with respect to the per capita options outstanding 
by all officers and directors, as predicted.  
 DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) theorize that firms hedg to reduce the level of 
asymmetric information between managers and sharehold rs.  If this is true, then it is 
expected that firms which are followed by a large number of analysts should hedge less,` 
as analysis reduces the level of asymmetric information.  Geczy, Minton, and Schrand 
(1997) test this hypothesis and find, contrary to prediction that, hedging increases with 
the number of analysts.  Furthermore, Graham and Rogers (2002), find no evidence that 
firms with greater levels of asymmetric information te d to hedge less.  Their proxy for 
the degree of asymmetric information is the percent of the firm owned by institutional 
investors.  Institutional investors reduce the level of asymmetric information, as they 
have access to inside information concerning the firm’s prospects.  Contrary to the other 
studies mentioned, Tufano (1996) does find, as predicted by theory, that gold mining 
firms hedge less as the percentage  of the firm which is owned by large outside block-
holders increases.  
3.2.d Hedging and Firm Value 
 The prior subsection discussed the empirical motivation for hedging.  In this 
subsection, the question whether hedging enhances the firm’s value is addressed. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine whether the use of foreign currency derivatives 




which hedge is 4.5% higher than that of nonhedging firms, the result is a premium of 
about $153 million (Tobin’s Q is the market value of the firm divided by its replacement 
cost). However, an issue with their study is that teir sample consists of conglomerates 
that operate across several different industries.  The conglomerates create a sample bias 
as it is known that hedging varies across industries (Allayannis and Weston 1999; Geczy, 
Minton, and Schrand 1997) as does Tobin’s Q.  Thus, their result could be industry-
driven rather than hedging related.  When controlling for industry effects using an 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, the hedging premium drops to 3.66% and becomes 
insignificant.   
 To control for industry effects, two other studies examined the hedging benefits in 
a specific industry.  More specifically, Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) examined 
hedging and firm value in the airline industry and Jin and Jorion (2006) addressed the 
question from the oil and gas industry.  Carter, Rogers and Simkins found a positive and 
significant relationship between an airline’s Tobin’s Q and the percent of next year’s jet 
fuel that is hedged.  The hedging premium for the aver ge airline’s Tobin’s Q is 10.2%.  
This roughly represents a $130 million hedging premium to an airline.  Contrary to Carter 
and Rogers and Simkins results, Jin and Jorion  did not find a positive relation between 
the firm’s value and its hedging activities, thus, suggesting hedging does not increase the 
value of oil and gas firms.   
As discussed in a prior subsection, financial and operational hedges are used in 
tandem to manage a firm’s risk.  Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001) examine whether 
the use of operational and financial hedges is value-enhancing to the firm.  They do not 




operational hedges.  In their study, the operational hedge is proxied by the dispersion of 
the firm’s subsidiaries, and the firm’s value is measured by the market to book ratio.  
Though the use of operational hedging alone doesn’t command a hedging premium, the 
implementation of both operational and financial hedges does account for a 16.7% 
premium to a firm’s market to book.  This result suggests that a risk management policy 
that uses both operational and financial hedges is value-enhancing to the firm.   
If hedging does add value to the firm, then is the hedging premium associated 
with lower expected taxes, a reduction in financial d stress cost, or an increase in 
investments, is it or a result of managers maximizing their utility?  Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) believe that the hedging premium is attributed to the tax saving resulting 
from an increase in a firm’s debt tax shield, a reduction in its bankruptcy cost, and 
mitigation of the underinvestment problem.  Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) 
explicitly tested the underinvestment problem for the airline industry and found that 
increasing the percent of the next year’s jet fuel hedged by one percent increases the 
airline capital expenditures-to-sales ratio by 7.4%.  Furthermore, they report that the 
hedging premium attributed to the protection of the airline’s capital expenditures is 21%.  
This result suggests that the underinvestment problem is significant to the firm’s value 
and commands the attention of a firm’s risk management program. 
In conclusion, this section discussed the theories which contend hedging adds 
value to the firm.  First, by examining the condition in which hedging is irrelevant to the 
firm’s value, thereby relaxing the assumption of a perfect market, it was shown that 
hedging increases a firm’s value when there are (1) taxes, (2) financial distress costs, (3) 




managers, and (5) informational differences between ma agers and shareholders. 
Furthermore, the empirical literature concerning the use of financial and operational 
hedges and the use of hedging substitutes to control a firm’s risk was discussed. The 
empirical literature suggests that firms do not hedge as a consequence of a convex tax 
function.  Lastly, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that risk management does 
increase a firm’s value. 
3.3 Operational Hedges / Data 
 As Modigliani and Miller (1958) show, in a perfect world, the use of financial 
derivatives to manage a firm’s risk provides no additional value to the firm.  This is 
similarly true for the operational hedge, which is defined as those operational activities 
which the firm engages in to mitigate its risk (Boyabaitli and Toktay 2004).  To illustrate, 
suppose a firm has a choice between two mutually exclusive investments; the first project 
requires an investment today, while the second project contains an option to delay 
investment until the next period.  Yet the differenc  between the investment cost of the 
first and second project is such that the net present value of the two projects is equal.  
Under this scenario, the firm is indifferent between the two projects, as both projects 
increase the value of the firm by the same amount.  However, a firm that is choosing to 
manage its risk will adopt the second project, for its isk (variance) is less.  The 
importance of this example is to illustrate the difference between the value a real option 
provides a firm through its investment decision andthe value a real option can possibly 
provide by mitigating the firm’s risk.  Next, the justifications presented in chapter two for 




3.3.a Fleet Composition (Diversity of Fleet) 
 A diverse fleet gives the airline the flexibility to adjust the level of its capacity to 
meet the condition of a dynamic market.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994) analyze the choice 
between flexibility and scale using real option analysis.  Furthermore, using real options 
which a diverse fleet provides acts as an operationl hedge by reducing an airline’s losses 
during unfavorable periods.  To illustrate, when fuel prices are at such a level that 
operating a given route is unfavorable, the airline has a choice to whether quit servicing 
the particular route and wait until fuel prices fall or maintain service at a loss.  When exit 
or reentry costs are prohibitively expensive, the airline will choose to maintain operations 
and not exercise its options to exit.  Under this scenario, it is optimal for the airline to cut 
capacity to such a level where the airline is able to avoid the exit or reentry cost.  With a 
diverse fleet, the airline has this option.  For insta ce, when fuel prices are high, the 
airline increases the use of its smaller aircraft, esulting in a lower level of losses relative 
to a larger aircraft.  Appendix 2.A develops the argument more formally. 
I measure the diversity of an airline’s fleet using a proxy similar to Allayannis, 
Ihrig, and Weston’s (2001) geographic dispersion measure, and is referred to as the 
aircraft dispersion index.  The construction of the aircraft dispersion index is similar to 
that of the Hirchman-Herfindhal concentration index, which uses the different types of 


















   (3.16) 
where K is the total number of different models that airline “i” operates and “j” 




indicating the greatest degree of diversity.  If the airline operates only one type of 
aircraft, such as Southwest, then the index value is equal to zero.   
3.3.b Fleet Fuel Efficiency 
A large cost factor to airlines is jet fuel.  This fact suggests that airlines benefit 
from hedging against fluctuation in fuel prices.  An airline that choose to operate a newer 
fleet, which is a fuel-efficient fleet, have less exposure to the price of jet fuel.  To 
measure the airline’s decision to use a fuel-efficient fleet as an operational hedge, I use 
the average age of the airline’s fleet.   
 The proxy for the fuel efficiency of the airline fl et is the logarithm of the average 
age of the fleet.  The average age of an airline’s fl et is a weighted average of the age of 
the different aircraft models the airline operates.  The fleet age is reported annually and 
rounded to the nearest integer.  The two reasons for rounding to the nearest integer are 
that (1) many airlines only report the age of the fle t in round years and (2) it reduces 
possible biases created by smaller aircraft since smaller aircraft are usually younger.  
When the age of the fleet is not reported, the nearest / earliest possible reported age is 
used.  For instance, Mesa Airlines reported its fleet in 1998 but not 1999.  In this case, the 
age of Mesa’s fleet in 1998 is used for 1999.  The av rage age of the fleet is taken from 
the airlines 10-K.  
3.3.c Operating Leases 
 Operating leases provide airlines the opportunity to frequently adjust their fleet to 
changing conditions.  For instance, as the demand for a particular route changes, the 
airline can replace its current aircraft with those that are better suited for that market  




that their fleet size can adjust to changing market conditions.  In addition to staggering 
the life of its leases, many leasing contracts contain options clauses which allow the 
airline to purchase the aircraft at the end of the leasing agreement and/or to cancel its 
leasing obligation prior to the end of the lease.  Lastly, leasors sometimes renegotiate the 
terms of a lease.   
 To proxy for the airline’s ability to use operating leases as a hedge, I use the 
percentage of the airline’s fleet that is leased.  This proxy is calculated as the total 
number of aircraft the airline leases divided by the total number of aircraft owned and 
leased.  This proxy includes spare parts aircraft, aircraft not yet in service, and those that 
are subleased to other airlines.  The leasing data is obtained from the airlines’ annual 
10-K filings. 
To proxy for the degree to which the airline uses financial hedges, I use the 
percentage of the airline’s jet fuel hedged for next y ar.  To capture the impact of fuel 
contracts which lock in an airline’s fuels cost, I included an indicator variable for whether 
the airline has entered into a fuel pass-through agreement.  Fuel pass-through agreements 
are typically contracts between a regional airline a d a mainline airline.  These contracts 
cover a regional airline’s fuel costs for the service that it provides to the mainline carrier.  
The percent of jet fuel costs that are hedged and the use of fuel pass-through agreements 
are used as proxies by Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006).  This proxy is from the 
airline’s 10-K filing over the period 1994 to 2006.   








Variables Mean Median Min Max Std Dev
Tobin's Q 0.9542 0.7815 0.0145 3.9752 0.5684
Ln(Total Assets) 6.9943 6.6746 2.6207 10.3994 1.9373
Dividend Yield 0.1571 0.0000 0.0000 5.0000 0.5551
Cash Flow / Sales 0.0448 0.0714 -1.1692 1.2287 0.1470
Capital Expenditure / Sales 0.1243 0.0778 -0.0095 2.2333 0.1845
Long-term Debt to Assets 0.2790 0.2757 0.0000 1.3005 0.1961
Z Score 1.9829 1.6945 -4.7181 7.3858 1.7552
Cash / Sales 0.1733 0.1445 0.0000 0.6830 0.1290
Next Years Percent of Fuel Hedge 0.1317 0.0000 0.0000 0.9600 0.2213
Fuel Pass-through Agreement 0.2270 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4196
Exchange Rate Derivatives 0.2366 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4257
Interest Rate Derivatives 0.2903 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4547
Aircraft Dispersion Index 0.5326 0.5946 0.0000 0.8768 0.2792
Ln(Fleet Age) 2.1486 2.1972 0.0000 3.3322 0.6264
Percent of Fleet Leased 0.6577 0.6940 0.0000 1.0000 0.2465
Regional Airline 0.3010 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4595
Capacity Purchase Agreements 0.1973 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3986
Commuters 0.2145 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3129
Annual Average Price of Fuel 84.0980 68.6959 40.2688 192.2859 47.8910
Carryforward / Carryback Dummy 0.3110 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4637
Table IX reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for the following variables 
from 1994 – 2006:  The Aircraft Dispersion Index, Fleet Age,  Percent of Fleet Leased, Percent of  Next
Years Jet Fuel Hedged, Commuters, and an indicator for whether the airline has a Fuel Purchase 
Agreement (FuelPass), Capacity Agreement, or  whether the airline is a regional carrier are obtained from 




3.4  Model 
3.4.a Complements vs. Substitutes 
 This chapter uses a model similar to that of Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001) 
to test whether operational and financial hedges ar complements or substitutes.  The 
model regresses the airlines’ use of financial derivatives against the three operational 
hedges.  More formally the model is defined as: 
Hedgei,t = α0 +βdiversity(Fleet Diversityi,t) + βage(Agei,t) + βlease(Leased Fleeti,t)  +  (3.17)    
    + βDhedge(OtherHedgeDummyi,t) + βcontrol (Control Variablesi,t) + εi,t, 
Where: 
Hedge is the percent of next year’s fuel requirement hedged for airline “i" in 
period “t”, 
Fleet Diversity is the aircraft dispersion index in period “t’, 
Age is the logarithm of the average age of the airline’s fl et, 
Leased Fleet is the percent of the airline’s fleet that is leased, 
OtherHedgeDummy is one if the airline uses currency derivatives, interest rate 
derivatives or has entered into a fuel pass-through agreement, otherwise zero, 
and ε is the standard error term. 
Table X briefly lists the predicted signs of the coefficients in the model. 
 The variable Hedge is defined as the airline’s percentage of next year’s fuel 
requirements hedged and is further referred to as hedge.  An alternative fuel hedge 
variable (HedgDum) is defined as one if the airline hedges its fuel costs using derivatives, 
otherwise zero.  The percent of fuel hedged is prefer d since a dummy variable does not 
capture the degree to which a firm uses financial derivatives (Triki 2005).  Furthermore, 




engages in hedging (Haushalter 2000).  For the above mentioned reasons, both the Hedge 
and the HedgDum variables are used to measure the airlin s’ financial hedging activity.  
TABLE X 
Complements and Substitutes (Hypotheses) 
 
 If airlines are using financial and operational hedg s as complements, then a 
positive relationship exists between the diversity of the airlines’ fleets and their use of 
financial derivatives (βdiversity>0).  This relationship is expected if airlines use th  
diversity of their fleet to hedge against the uncertainty in long-term fuel price 
fluctuations, against which financial derivatives provide little protection.  The financial 
Variables Complements Substitutes Hedging Theory
Fleet Diversity + -
Ln(Fleet Age) (Age) - +
Leased Fleet + -
Long Term Debt to Assets (LTDA) +
Ln(Total Assets) (Size) +
Dividend Yield (DIV) +
Z Score +
Cash Flow / Sales (CFTS) -
Cash To Sales (Cash) -
Tobin's Q +
Dummy(Exchange, Interest, Fuel Pass) 
(OtherHedgeDummy) +
Regional Airline (REG) ?
Capacity Purchase Agreements (CAP) ?
Commuter ?
Annual Average Price of Fuel (AvgPrice) ?
Carryforward / Carryback Dummy (NOL) +
Predicted Coefficient Signs
Table X reports the predicted results of model 3.17. The model tests whether operational and 
financial hedges are complements or substitutes.  The model is: 
Hedgei,t = α0 +βdiversity(Fleet Diversityi,t) + βage(Agei,t) + βlease(Leased Fleeti,t)     
    + βDhedge(OtherHedgeDummyi,t) + βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t)+εi,t. 
 
Where: Hedge is the percent of next year’s fuel requirement hedged for airline “i" in period “t”, 
Fleet Diversity is the aircraft dispersion index in period “t’, Age is the logarithm of the average 
age of the airline’s fleet, Fleet Leased is the percent of the airline’s fleet that is leasd, 
OtherHedgeDummy is one if the airline uses currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives or 





derivatives are then used to protect against short-term price fluctuations (Carter, 
Pantzalis, and Simkins 2006).  Conversely, a negative relationship suggests that 
operational and financial hedges are substitutes (βdiversity<0).  As with the diversity of the 
fleet, a positive (negative) relationship between the percent of the airline’s fleet which is 
leased and the use of financial derivatives suggests tha  the two types are complements 
(substitutes).  
 A positive coefficient for the age of an airline’s fleet (βage>0) suggests that 
operational and financial hedges are substitutes.  An airline with an older fleet has greater 
exposure to fuel prices and uses financial derivatives to lower this risk.  Similarly, an 
airline with a newer fleet has lower exposure to fuel costs and has less incentive to hedge 
its fuel risk with financial derivatives.  A negative relationship between the age of an 
airline’s fleet and its use of financial derivatives suggests that operational and financial 
hedges are complements (βage<0). 
 The OtherHedgeDummy variable is an indicator for whether the airline uses any 
other type of financial contract to manage its risk.  The OtherHedgeDummy is 1 if the 
airline uses currency derivatives or interest rate derivatives or has a fuel pass-through 
agreement, otherwise 0.  This variable is included to control for the relationships which 
exist between the airline’s fleet and its use of financial derivatives.  For instance, airlines 
with international operations are more likely to use both fuel and currency derivatives.  
Furthermore, these airlines are more likely to operate a diverse fleet, due to their greater 





 The other control variables are the logarithm of the airline’s total assets (Size), 
Long Term Debt Ratio (LTDA), Dividend Yield (DIV), Z-Score, Cash Flow to Sales 
(CFTS), Cash to Sales (Cash), Logarithm of Tobin’s Q, Capital Expenditures to Sales 
(CAPTS), and a Net Operating Loss Carryforward and Carryback dummy variable 
(NOL).  These variables are from COMPUSTAT.  The dummy variable for whether the 
airline is a regional airline (REG) and the Commuter variable are gathered from the 
airlines’ 10-K filings.  The annual average price of jet fuel (AvgPrice) is from the 
Department of Energy and is the average of the daily Gulf Coast fuel price per year.  The 
variable  Size is used to control for the fact that larger firms tend to hedge (Nance, Smith, 
and Smithson 1993).  
 The variable LTDA is included in the model to contr l for the fact that hedging 
theory suggests that firms hedge to increase their debt capacity by reducing their chances 
of financial distress (Graham and Rogers 2002; Smith and Stulz 1985).  Furthermore, 
there is a positive relationship between the extent to which a firm leases its assets and its 
use of debt (Ang and Peterson 1984).  The Z-Score variable is included because firms 
near financial distress tend not to hedge so they might exploit any upside potential at the 
bondholders’ expense (Stulz 1996).  Outliers of the Z-Score at the first and ninety-ninth 
percentiles are removed from the sample this becaus Hawaiian Airlines reported a 
Z-Score of -80.6 and -71.33 in 2003 and 2004 respectively.  The next lowest Z-Score is 
-6.17. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) contend that firms with higher dividends have 
a greater incentive to hedge as a way to avoid financial distress.  Furthermore, firms with 
greater cash flow and higher cash levels are less likely to fall under financial distress and 




 The logarithm of Tobin’s Q and the CAPTS variables are proxies for a firm’s 
growth potential, as firms will protect their future growth options through hedging.  A 
dummy variable for whether the airline is a regional carrier (REG) controls for 
differences between mainline and regional carriers.  The REG variable is coded as one if 
the airline provides service to a mainline airline, otherwise zero20. The variable NOL is 
predicted to be positive, as hedging increases firm value when firms face convexity in 
their tax schedule.  
 Airlines which operate turbo-props typically have a diverse fleet. However, these 
short haul commuter aircraft do not provide the flexibility which a regional jet does.  That 
is, turbo-props lack the nautical distance and fuel-efficiency that a regional jet offers and 
which allows regional jets to act as substitutes for larger aircraft.  Thus, the control 
variable Commuter which is the percent of an airline’s fleet that is turbo-props is added 
to the model.  
 Many mainline airlines have entered into capacity purchase agreements with 
regional carriers.  Under these contracts, the mainline airline is responsible for revenue, 
fuel costs, and scheduling.  In return, the regional airline is guaranteed a set profit margin 
plus a performance bonus.  Under some of these contracts, the mainline airline subleases 
aircraft to the regional carrier for the duration of the contract.  Under these types of 
contracts, the mainline airline benefits from the flexibility a diverse fleet offers without 
actually operating one. Thus, the control variable CAP is included in the model which is 
coded as 1 if the mainline airline has entered into a capacity purchase agreement, 
otherwise 0.  
                                                




 As the price of fuel rises, airlines will exercise th ir options by increasing the use 
of their smaller and/or more fuel-efficient aircraft.  Also, there is a greater probability 
airlines will upgrade to a newer fuel-efficient fleet when fuel prices are high.  To control 
for this relationship and any other relationship between the price of fuel and an airline’s 
tendency to hedge, the AvgPrice variable is included in the model.   
3.4.b Hedging and Firm Value     
 To test whether the use of operational and financial hedges increases the value of 
the firm, I use a model similar to that proposed by Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001).  
The model regresses Tobin’s Q against the operational and financial proxies and their 
products.   More formally, the model is: 
 Log(Tobin’s Qi,t) = α + βhedge*Hedgei,t (3.18)  
     + (βdiversity + βdiversity/hedgeHedgei,t) *(Fleet Diversityi,t)    
   + (βage + βage/hedgeHedgei,t)*βage(Agei,t) 
   + βleases(Leased Fleeti,t) + βfuelpass(FuelPassi,t)  
   + βder_FX(Der_FXi,t) + βDer_IR (Der_IRi,t)   
   + βcontrol (Control_Variablesi,t) + εi,t. 
where: 
Hedge is the percent of next year’s fuel requirement hedged for airline “i" in 
period “t”, 
Fleet Diversity is the aircraft dispersion index in period “t’, 
Age is the logarithm of the average age of the airline’s fl et, 
Leased Fleet is the percent of the airline’s fleet that is leased, 
FuelPass indicates whether the airline has entered into a fuel pass through 
agreement, 
Der_FX and Der_IR indicate whether the airline uses currency or interest rate 




ε is the standard error term. 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of the firm 
divided by its replacement cost, is used to measure the value of the firm.  An 
approximation for Tobin’s Q is used, as the true onis impossible to calculate.  The 









Q  (3.19) 
where MVE is the market value of the firm; PS is the liquidation value of preferred stock; 
BVINV is the book value of inventory; LTDEBT is the book value of the firm’s long 
term debt; CL and CA are the book value of the firm’s current liabilities and current 
assets respectively; and TA is the book value of the firm’s total assets (Chung and Pruitt 
1994; DaDalt, Donaldson, and Garner 2003).  This approach to calculating Tobin’s Q 
was proposed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) and is simpler than the one proposed by Perfect 
and Wiles (1994).  Perfect and Wiles (1994) method w uld reduce the size of the sample 
to an unacceptable level (Carter, Rogers, and Simkins 2006) , so Chung and Pruitt’s 
(1994) proxy is used for Tobin’s Q.   
Table XI briefly lays out the predicted signs of the coefficients of the above 
model and the hypotheses. The hypotheses are: 
H1: Financial hedges increase the value of the airline (βhedge >0, βfuelpass >0, 
βDer_fx >0and βDer_IR>0). Hedge, FuelPass, Der_FX and Der_IR proxy for the firm’s 
hedging activity.  The predicted sign of the hedging variables is positive since hedging 
increases the firm’s value.  The variables Der_FX and Der_IR are codes as one if the 
airline uses foreign exchange rate derivatives (Der_FX) or interest rate derivatives 




H2: Operational Hedges are value-enhancing to an airline (βdiversity >0, βage <0, 
βFleet_Leased > 0). The prediction is that a diverse fleet / leased flet provides an airline an 
operational hedge which increases the airline’s value.  A newer fuel-efficient fleet 
reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel prices and thus enhances the airline’s value. 
 H3: A comprehensive hedging program that uses both operational and financial 
hedges increases an airline’s value (βdiversity/hedge>0, βage/hedge<0).   The prediction is that 
using operational and financial hedges together provides the airline additional value 
beyond the value gained by solely using an operation l r financial hedge. In the case of 
a diverse fleet, increasing the diversity of the fleet by 0.10 increases the effectiveness of 
the financial hedge by 0.10*βdiversity/hedge
21
.   In the case of the age of the fleet, reducing 
the age of an airline’s fleet by one divided the agof its fleet increases the effectiveness 
of the financial hedge by βage/hedge. A positive βage/hedge, suggests that using financial 
derivates offsets the additional exposure gained by using a less fuel-efficient fleet and 
thus increases the value of the airline.   
The control variables that are from COMPUSTAT that are similar to those 
proposed by Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006), are 
the logarithm of assets (Size), dividend yield (DIV), cash flow to sales (CFTS), cash to 
sales (CTS), long term debt ratio (LTDA), capital exp nditures to sales CAPTS, and 
Z-Score.  The control variables from the airlines’ 10-K filings are the regional airline 
dummy variable (REG), capacity purchase agreement dummy variable (CAP), and the 
percent of the fleet which is turbo-prop (Commuter).  The annual average price of fuel 
(AvgPrice) is from the Department of Energy. 
                                                
21 Restated another way, increasing the percent of fuel hedged by 10% increases the effectiveness of a 




The variable Size controls for the fact that larger firms are more likely to use 
financial derivatives.  The variable DIV controls for a firm’s access to the capital 
markets.  The predicted sign of DIV is ambiguous since firms that pay dividends might 
forgo profitable projects, which causes their Tobin’s Q to be higher.  However, firms 
which pay dividends due to their excess cash flow will have fewer forgone investments, 
causing their Tobin’s Q to be lower.  The variable CFTS variable measures the firm’s 
profitability.  Profitable firms have higher Tobin’s Q ratios.  The variable CAPTS 
controls for the fact that firms with greater growth prospects have higher Tobin’s Q.  
The variable LTDA controls for any relationship betw en a firm’s value and the 
degree to which it is leveraged.  The Z-Score represents the fact that firms near financial 
distress are more likely to incur deadweight costs a sociated with bankruptcy.  Z-Scores 
in the first or the ninety-ninth percentile are removed.  
 The variable CAP controls for the fact that capacity purchase agreements are 
similar to operating a diverse fleet.  The inclusion of the variable Commuter controls for 
the fact that turbo-props are incapable of acting as a substitute for larger aircraft.  The 
expected sign for the coefficient of the variable AvgPrice is negative as the value of a 





Hedging and Airline Value (Hypotheses) 
 
   
Predicted values Hypothesis
Percent of Next Year's Fuel Hedged (Hedge)
+
Financial Derivatives increase firm 
value 
FuelPass +
Foreign Currency Derivative Dummy (Der_FX)
+
Financial Derivatives increase firm 
value 
Interest Rate Derivative Dummy (Der_IR)
+
Financial Derivatives increase firm 
value 
Aircraft Dispersion (Fleet Diversity)
+








Operational Hedging increases firm 
value
Ln(Fleet Age) X (Hedge)
-




Operational Hedging increases firm 
value
Ln(Total Assets) (Size) ?
Dividend Yield (DIV) ?
Long Term Debt to Assets (LTDA) ?
Cash Flow / Sales (CFTS) +
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CAPTS) +
Z-Score +
Cash To Sales (Cash) ?
Regional Airline (REG) ?
Capacity Purchases Agreements (CAP) +
Annual Average Price of Fuel (AvgPrice) -
Commuter ?
Table XI reports the predicted results of model 3.18.  The model tests whether operational and financial 
hedges are value enhancing to the airlines.  The model is: 
Log(Tobin’s Qi,t) = α + βhedge*Hedgei,t         
  + (βdiversity + βdiversity/hedgeHedgei,t) *(Fleet Diversityi,t)   
 + (βage + βage/hedgeHedgei,t)*βage(Agei,t) 
  + βleases(Leased Fleeti,t) + βfuelpass(FuelPassi,t)  
 + βder_FX(Der_FXi,t) + βDer_IR(Der_IRi,t)   
 + βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t) +εi,t. 
 
Where Tobin’s Q is Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) proxy for Tobin’s Q, Hedge is the percent of next year’s 
fuel requirement hedged for airline “i" in period “t”, Fleet Diversity is the aircraft dispersion index in 
period “t’, Age is the logarithm of the average age of the airline’s fl et, Fleet Leased is the percent of the 
airline’s fleet that is leased, FuelPass indicates whether the airline has entered into a fuel pass through 
agreement, Der_FX and Der_IR indicate whether the airline uses currency or interest rate derivatives 






 Table XII reports the results for whether operational and financial hedges are 
complements or substitutes.  Table XIII and Table XIV presents the results for whether 
operational and financial hedges are value enhancing to the airline.  
3.5.a Complements vs. Substitutes 
 Table XII reports the results from model 3.17.  Model 3.17 regresses the airline’s 
financial hedging activity against the different operational hedges. Table X reports the 
predicted hypotheses  Panel A of Table XII reports the results of the base model 3.17 
while Panel B reports the results using different combinations of the operational hedges.  
Column (1) of Table XII Panel A is a Tobit random effects model with the dependent 
variable as the percent hedged (Hedge).  Columns (2) use a Logit random effects model 
with the dependent variable defined as  is one if the airline’s percent hedged is greater 
than zero, otherwise zero (HedgDum).   All columns of Panel B use a Tobit random 
effects model with the dependent variable as Hedge.  Each model of Panel A and B 
includes a year dummy variable, which is not reported.  
 The coefficient for Fleet Diversity is positive and significant at the 10% level in 
five of the columns from both Panel A and B.  That is, airlines that operate a diversity 
fleet are more likely to use financial derivatives to hedge fuel prices.  A particular counter 
argument of the above result is that a diverse fleet increases the risk exposure to an airline 
and financial hedges are used to offset this increased risk. However, Chapter 2 shows that 
the diversity of the airline’s fleet is an effective operational hedge against jet fuel prices.  




uses of financial hedges are complements, rather than the use of financial derivatives 
being a means to offset any additional fuel risk associated with operating a diverse fleet.  
There is no significant relationship between the fuel-efficiency of the fleet (Age) 
and the degree to which an airline hedges. Similarly, there is no significant relationship 
between the percent of the fleet which is leased (Lased Fleet) and the degree to which an 
airline hedges.  The result that the estimated coeffi ient for Leased Fleet is statistically 
insignificant is surprising as Chapter 2 found evidnce that leasing an airline’s fleet 
increases the airline’s exposure to fuel prices.  This finding leads to the expectation that 
airlines which lease their fleet will use financial hedges to offset the increased risk 






Complements and Substitutes 
 
Column (1) Column (2)
Hedge HedgDum




Fleet Diversity 0.3642*    
(0.2079)  



































Log of Tobin's Q 0.1650*    
(0.0935)  


































Number of observations 228 228
# Censored 110
Log Likelihood -58.402 -84.076
* 10% significance
**  5% significance
*** 1% significance
Tobit / Random Effects Logit / Random Effect
Panel A
Panel A reports the results of model (3.17)
Hedgei,t = α0 +βdiversity(Fleet Diversityi,t) + βage(Agei,t) 
+ βleases(Leased Fleeti,t)    + βDhedge(OtherHedgeDummyi,t) 
+ βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t) +εi,t.
Column (1) dependent variable (Hedge) is the Percent of Next Years Fuel Hedged. The 
regression is a tobit–random effects model.  Column (2) uses a logit – random effects 
model. Column three’s dependent variable (HedgDum) is 1 if the airline’s percent of fuel 
hedged is greater than zero, otherwise 0.  A year dummy is included in each model but 




TABLE XII (Cont.) 
Complements and Substitutes with Individual Operational Hedges 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6)
Fleet Diversity Age Leased Fleet
Fleet Diversity 
& Leased Fleet
















Fleet Diversity 0.3451*    
(0.1955)  
0.3579*    
(0.1953)  























































































Log of Tobin's Q 0.1540*    
(0.0795)  
0.1502*    
(0.0888)  




0.1536*    
(0.0903)  


























































































Number of observations 252 229 246 246 228 229
# Censored 134 111 128 128 110 111
Log Likelihood -61.240 -60.162 -61.757 -59.968 -60.063 -58.594
* 10% significance
**  5% significance
*** 1% significance
Panel B
PanelB reports the results of model (3.17)
Hedgei,t = α0 +βdiversity(Fleet Diversityi,t) + βage(Agei,t) + βlease(Leased Fleet i,t)  + βDhedge(OtherHedgeDummyi,t) 
+ βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t) + εi,t. 
The regression is a tobit–random effects model. Themodel includes a year dummy variable which is not reported.  




The AvgPrice variable is significant in most models, at least at the 5%  level.  
That is, airlines tend to increase their hedging activity as the price of fuel increases.  This 
result is not surprising as Chapter 2 shows that an irli e’s exposure to fuel prices 
increases with the price of fuel.  As predicted, larger airlines (Size), airlines which have 
greater growth potential (Logarithm of Tobin’s Q), and airline that use financial hedges 
(OtherHedgeDummy) are more likely to hedge next year’s fuel requirements.  The other 
predicted values are insignificant.    
3.5.b Hedging and Firm Value 
 Table XIII reports the results of model 3.18. Columns (1-4) include both the 
operational and financial hedges, while Column (5) excludes the operational hedges. 
Column (5) is included as a comparison with prior research.  Column (1) reports the 
results using OLS with robust standard errors.  Columns (2, 3, and 5) use FGLS to adjust 
for heteroskedasticity, while column (4) uses a fixed effects model with heteroskedastic 
robust standard errors.   Each model includes a year dummy variable which is not 
reported.  
Table XIV reports the results of model 3.18 using different combinations of the 
operational hedges. All models of Table XIV use FGLS. Panel A of Table XIV reports 
the result of model 3.18 using only the aircraft dispersion index (Fleet Diversity), while 
Panel B reports the results using only the Age variable. Panel C reports the result of 
model 3.18 with different combinations of the variables Fleet Diversity, Age, and Leased 
Fleet . The first column of Panel A and B includes all the operational hedges and is 




The results concerning the benefits to the airline for using financial hedges is 
mixed. The coefficient for Hedge is positive and significant in most models. However, 
the use of fuel pass-through agreements (FuelPass) significantly reduces the value of the 
airline, this result is significant in most models. For instance, Column (2) of Table XIII, 
the FuelPass coefficient is -0.3005 and significant at the 1% level.  Using the mean 
Tobin’s Q of 0.95, entering into a fuel pass-through a reement reduces the airline’s 
Tobin’s Q by about 0.29 (0.95*.30) or 30%.  An argument for a negative FuelPass 
variable is that the variable proxies for regional airline carriers. However, the coefficient 
for regional airline (REG) is positive in most models and significant in the complete 
model of Column (2) of Table XIII, and Column (1) of Table XIV, Panel A.  Further 
complicating the results concerning the benefits of hedging, the variable Der_IR is 





Hedging and Airline Value 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
OLS with 















































0.3792*    
(0.2074)  






0.2714*    
(0.1428)  








































































































0.1829*    
(0.1012)  
































Number of observations 236 227 227 227 258
F-Statistic / Wald 17.19 1065.31 1121.14 21.52 531.74
R-Square 0.6764
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
The table  reports the results of model (3.18)
Log(Tobin’s Qi,t) = α + βhedge*Hedgei,t + (βdiversity+ βdiversity/hedge(Hedgei,t)) *(Fleet Diversityi,t) 
+ (βleases+ βleases/hedge(Hedgei,t))*(Leased Fleeti,t)+ (βage+ βage/hedge(Hedgei,t))* βage(Agei,t)
+ βfuelpass(FuelPassi,t) + βDer_FX(Der_FXi,t) + βDer_IR(Der_IRi,t)  + βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t) + εi,t.
Column (1) uses OLS with robust standard errors. Columns (2,3 and 5) use FGLS to control for heteroskedasticity. 
Column (4) uses fixed effects.  Column three excludes foreign currency (Der_FX) and interest rate derivatives 
(IR_FX). Column (5) excludes the operational hedges. All models include a year dummy variable which are not 






Hedging and Airline Value (Fleet Diversity) 
 
 







Fleet Diversity X 
































































































































































Number of observations 227 248 248 242 242
F-Statistic / Chi2 1121.14 813.82 906.50 856.45 933.84
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
Panel A
PanelA reports the results of model (3.18)
Log(Tobin’s Qi,t) = α + βhedge*Hedgei,t + (βdiversity+ βdiversity/hedge(Hedgei,t)) *(Fleet Diversityi,t) 
+ (βleases+ βleases/hedge(Hedgei,t))*(Leased Fleeti,t)+ (βage + βage/hedge(Hedgei,t))*βage(Agei,t)
+ βfuelpass(FuelPassi,t) + βDer_FX(Der_FXi ,t) + βDer_IR(Der_IRi,t)  + βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t) +εi,t.
Columns one through five use FGLS to control for heteroskedasticity.  Columns (2-5) is model 3.18 with the inclusion of the 
Aircraft Dispersion index (Fleet Diversity) and different combinations of the operational hedges. Column (1) includes all 
operational hedges and is included as a comparison. All models include a year dummy variable which arenot reported. See Table 




TABLE XIV (Cont.) 
Hedging and Airline Value (Age) 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
All OP's Age of Fleet
Age & 
HedgeXAge












































































Cash -0.3934**  
(0.1669)  
-0.3710*    
(0.2054)  



















































































Number of observations 227 228 228 227 227
F-Statistic / Chi2 1121.14 888.89 871.95 1071.43 1008.19
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
Panel B
Panel B reports the results of model (3.18)
Log(Tobin’s Qi,t) = α + βhedge*Hedgei,t + (βdiversity+ βdiversity/hedge(Hedgei,t)) *(Fleet Diversityi,t) 
+ (βleases+ βleases/hedge(Hedgei,t))*(Leased Fleeti,t)+ (βage + βage/hedge(Hedgei,t))* βage(Agei,t)
+ βfuelpass(FuelPassi,t) + βDer_FX(Der_FXi,t) + βDer_IR(Der_IRi,t)  + βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t) + εi,t.
Columns (1-5) use FGLS to control for heteroskedasticity.  Columns (2-5) is model 3.18 with the inclusion of the Age variable 
and different combinations of the operational hedges.Column (1) includes all operational hedges and is included as a 





TABLE XIV (Cont.) 
Hedging and Airline Value (Leased Fleet) 
 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6)
Fleet Diversity, 
Age 
Fleet Diversity,     
HedgeX(Fleet 




































































0.3527*    
(0.2037)  
0.3398*    
(0.2059)  
0.3574*    
(0.2083)  
0.3684*    
(0.2068)  
0.3680*    
(0.2091)  




























































































Leased Fleet -0.2485**  
(0.1079)  




Regional Airline 0.1667**  
(0.0729)  



































Number of observations 228 228 228 227 227 227
F-Statistic / Chi2 1008.49 1107.29 1005.67 1051.24 1102.60 1051.11
* 10% significance (two-sided test)
**  5% significance (two-sided test)
*** 1% significance (two-sided test)
Panel C
PanelC reports the results of model (3.18)
Log(Tobin’s Qi,t) = α + βhedge*Hedgei,t + (βdiversity+ βdiversity/hedge(Hedgei,t)) *(Fleet Diversityi,t) 
+ (βleases+ βleases/hedge(Hedgei,t))*(Leased Fleeti,t)+ (βage + βage/hedge(Hedgei,t))*βage(Agei,t)
+ βfuelpass(FuelPassi,t) + βDer_FX(Der_FXi,t) + βDer_IR(Der_IRi,t)  + βcontrol(Control Variablesi,t) + εi,t.
Columns (1-6)use FGLS to control for heteroskedasticity.  Columns (1-6) are model 3.18 with different combinations of the operational 





 For the operational hedges, Fleet Diversity is negative and significant at least at 
the 5%  level in all models.  To illustrate the reduction in value, an airline which does not 
use fuel hedges and operates a diverse fleet with a mean aircraft dispersion index of 0.53, 
has a Tobin’s Q that is 17% (-0.3237*0.53) less than an airline operating an uniform 
fleet. Furthermore, if this hypothetical airline chose to hedge next years fuel requirements 
at the industry mean for airlines which hedge (0.30), then its reduction in value compared 
to a uniform fleet with similar hedging activities would be 22.6% (See Equation (3.20 
below). 
  (3.20)  
 
 
The result showing that a diverse fleet reduces value is surprising since the results in the 
prior chapter found that the diversity and the fuel efficiency of the fleet are effective 
operational hedges against jet fuel costs.  However, this section illustrates that though 
operational hedges are effective at reducing a firm’s exposure, the cost of implementing 
such a hedge outweighs its benefits.  
Column (2) of Table XIII shows Age to be 0.1313 and significant at the1% level. 
The positive value for the age of the fleet means that operating an older less fuel-efficient 
fleet increases the value of the airline. The results of Table XIII suggest that for an airline 
with a fleet age of 10 years (the industry average, Table I), reducing the age of its fleet by 
one year causes the airline’s Tobin’s Q to decline by 1.3% (.1331/10). The result that a 
newer aircraft reduces an airline value is confirmed by Table XIV Panel C column (4), 
( ) ( )










which excludes the cross-products of operational hedges and the percent of fuel hedged. 
The cross-product of Age and Hedge is insignificant in all models (Table XIII and XIV). 
Thus, there is no evidence that using a fuel-efficint fleet with fuel hedges affects an 
airlines value.  
 The coefficient for Leased Fleet is negative in all models, suggesting a leased 
fleet is harmful to an airlines value. This result holds when the cross-products are 
excluded from the model (Table XIV Panel C Column (4)). To illustrate, increasing the 
percent of the fleet which is leased by 1% reduce the airlines Tobin’s Q by 0.25% (Table 
XIV Panel C Column (4)). 
The result that the combined use of both financial and operational hedges does not 
increase the value of the firm is surprising. Table XIII and Table XIV shows that is the 
cross-product of Fleet Diversity and Hedge is negative and the cross-product of the Age 
and Hedge is insignificant. This results contradicts the finding of Allayannis, Ihrig, and 
Weston (2001) and Kim, Mathur, and Nam (2006) who find that operational and financial 
hedges increase a firm’s value.  However, for both of t ese studies, their proxy of the 
operational hedge is ineffective at reducing the firm’s exposure to currency rates.  
Therefore, the relationship between the firms’ values and their operational hedges 
possibly suffers from measurement error.   
3.6 Summary 
 This chapter analyzes three operational hedges that are at the disposal of an airline 
to determine if operational and financial hedges ar complements or substitutes.  
Furthermore, the question of whether operational and financial hedges increase the value 




fleet, the leasing of the airline’s fleet and the us  of a newer fuel-efficient fleet.  A 
diverse fleet and the leasing of an airline’s fleet, provide the airline with the option to 
adjust its capacity during periods of high fuel prices.  A newer fuel-efficient fleet reduces 
the airline’s overall exposure to the price of jet fuel. 
 The evidence presented in this chapter shows that airlines that use operational 
hedges to manage their risk are more likely to alsouse financial hedges.  That is, airlines 
which operate a diverse fleet are more likely to use financial derivatives.  This makes 
sense, as changing the operations of a firm is costly and is only done once a certain 
threshold as been reached.  For instance, it is costly f r an airline to mothball an aircraft, 
and thus the airline will delay this decision until market conditions have deteriorated 
enough to justify such an action.  Financial hedges ar  less costly to implement once the 
fixed cost of a hedging program has been established and thus are better suited for the 
fine tuning of a firm’s current needs.  
 The findings show that financial derivatives which proxy for a firm’s hedging 
activity underestimate the extent to which firms hedg  their risk exposures.  That is, other 
studies that focus on the extent to which hedging reduces a firm’s risk exposure exclude 
the use of operational hedges, which are a significa t omponent of a firm’s hedging 
program. 
 A surprising result of this study shows that the us of operational hedges actually 
decrease the value of the firm, while there is no consistent conclusion for value that 
financial hedges provide an airline.  In the airline dustry, fuel derivatives are beneficial 
to the airline’s value.  However, the use of fuel pass-through agreements actually reduces 




reduce the value of the airline.  That is, a diverse fleet, a newer fuel-efficient fleet and the 









4.1 Conclusion  
 The airline industry possesses several possible venues to manage its risk exposure 
to the price of jet fuel.  Airlines use financial hedges such as financial derivatives and 
fuel pass-through agreements to diminish their exposure to fuel prices.  Also, airlines 
have the choice of utilizing the real options embedded in their operations to hedge their 
fuel price exposure.  A few of the real options that airlines can use to manage their risk 
exposure to fuel prices are: the diversity of their fl ets, the use of fuel-efficient fleets, and 
the leasing of the airline’s aircraft.  The diversity of an airline’s fleet and the use of a 
leased fleet allow an airline to adjust its operating fleet to meet the needs of the dynamic 
market in which it operates.  A fuel-efficient fleet r duces the airline’s overall exposure 
to fuel prices.  
 The evidence of this dissertation is clear: first, airlines show a significant 
exposure to the price of fuel; second, airlines use both operational and financial hedges to 
reduce their risk exposure to fuel prices; third, airlines use operational and financial 
hedges as complements. The last and most surprising esult shows, financial hedges 
provide mixed results concerning the benefits to the airline’s value, while operational 




The need to use operational or financial hedges exists only if an exposure to an 
underlying asset also exists.  The individual airlines do exhibit significant exposure to the 
price of jet fuel.  That is, about 29% of airlines show a significant exposure to jet fuel 
prices.  Furthermore, the airline industry exhibits greater levels of exposure to fuel prices 
when the price of fuel is on the rise.  Similarly, the industry's exposure to fuel prices is 
the greatest when the price of fuel is above its historical norm.  However, there is no 
evidence that the industry exhibits different degres of exposure to fuel prices when the 
volatility of the fuel prices is above or below its historical norm.  In short, airlines exhibit 
a significant exposure to fuel prices, which justifies the use of financial or operational 
hedges.  
 The evidence shows that airlines use financial hedges to mitigate their exposure to 
fuel prices.  I find that the use of both financial derivatives and fuel pass-through 
agreements significantly reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel prices.  Similar to financial 
hedges, operational hedges lessen the effects of fuel price movements on an airline.  
More specifically, a diverse fleet and a newer fuel-efficient fleet are used as effective 
operational hedges against fuel prices.  Second, there is evidence that the embedded 
option to switch to a newer fleet reduces an airline’s exposure to fuel prices.  Though a 
newer fuel-efficient fleet provides a higher degree of protection against fuel price 
movements, the option to upgrade to newer fuel-effici nt aircraft from lesser fuel-
efficient aircraft acts to lessen the effects of fuel price movements on an older fleet.  This 
is significant to other studies that analyze the benefits of operational hedges, for a firm 




no evidence that airlines use or are able to use a leased fleet to reduce their exposure to 
fuel prices. 
 This dissertation findings show that airlines use financial and operational hedges 
as complements.  That is, airlines with diverse flets are more likely to use financial 
hedges.  This result suggests that airlines use operational hedges to manage their long-
term exposure to fuel costs and use financial derivatives to fine tune their short-term 
hedging needs.  A critique of this argument is thatairlines with a diverse fleet are more 
likely to use financial hedges to reduce any increased exposure to fuel prices associated 
with their fleet make-up.  However, this s 
tudy finds that a diverse fleet is an effective operational hedge for reducing an airline’s 
exposure to the price of fuel. 
 The last and most surprising result shows that there are mixed results on the 
benefit of hedging to an airline’s value. That is, the use of fuel pass-through agreements, 
a diverse fleet, a newer fuel-efficient fleet, or the leasing of an airline’s fleet, all lessen 
the airline's value.  Furthermore, there is no evidnce suggesting that both financial and 
operational hedges are value enhancing to the firm.However, the use of financial 
derivatives to hedge the airline exposure to fuel prices is value-enhancing to the airline. 
  In conclusion, this study shows that operational hedges are an integral part of a 
firm's hedging initiative.  If airlines are able to use their real options to manage risk, then 
so can other industries with greater operational flexibility.  Furthermore, this essay finds 
that operational and financial hedges are complements.  This result confirms the finding 
of Allayannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001).  However, contrary to their study, this study 




which attempt to determine the motivation for hedging, the effectiveness of hedging 
programs, or whether hedging is value-enhancing are bi sed as they have excluded the 
operational hedge.  Lastly, this study brings into question the results of prior studies 
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